Showing posts with label risk. Show all posts
Showing posts with label risk. Show all posts

Tuesday, 17 September 2013

Latest update on Carbon 14 at Chatham

This post includes the the responses from the MOD and the Environment Agency (EA)

FOI request to the Environment Agency 11 August

Dear sir

                the MOD in response to a recent FOI request (ref 1)  has said that  0.95 GBq of Carbon 14 was disposed of by burial at Chatham Dockyard.  The MOD had previously disclosed that the waste buried was short lived Cobalt 60. Has the EA been informed of this new information, if so what action is the EA taking to ensure the MOD provide updated risk assessment and ensuring that the burial site meets Regulatory standards.   I feel that this is important, in that unlike other radioactive waste disposal sites, this site is in an urban area about to undergo redevelopment (ref 2) . Background information (ref3).

References

1: Request for Information under the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 Further to my letter of 26 July 2013, I am now in a position to provide you with a substantive response to your request for information regarding nuclear waste disposal at Chatham Docks.

2: The Chatham Waters development

3:  Chatham an urban nuclear waste dump and a lasting legacy of the nuclear submarine programme


Environment Agency (EA) Response 30 August

"Thank you for your enquiry in respect of a radioactive waste burial at Chatham, Kent.

We have been aware of the authorised disposal of waste from the site at Chatham where the 
Ministry of Defence (MOD) operated part of the site as a submarine refuelling facility (both as Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Pollution (HMIP) and now as the Environment Agency).

HMIP was originally made aware that the wastes disposed of were primarily based on Cobalt 60 and that MOD’s environmental monitoring programme has also been based on Cobalt 60. We have recently (in 2012) been made aware of the presence of Carbon 14 and earlier this month (August) of a maximum estimated activity - about 0.95 Giga Becquerels of Carbon 14 disposed within this waste. MOD disposed of approximately 9000 cubic metres of waste at this site. Assuming the maximum activity of Carbon 14 this indicates an estimated activity concentration of about 0.04 Mega Becquerel per cubic metre or 0.032 MBq per tonne. 

You asked what action we are taking to ensure that the MOD provide an updated risk assessment. In answering this we have taken into consideration current legislation and not legislation in force when the disposals were made. If MOD or any other operator were to dispose of these wastes at the activities they contain today such wastes would be classed as “Out of Scope” under the Environmental Permitting Regulations 2010 (Exemption Orders) – less than 10 Bq/g for Carbon 14 and 1 Bq/g for the previously declared Cobalt 60. As such the material or waste that was disposed would not be classified as radioactive waste. 

The basis on which the numerical values and waste disposal criteria have been developed are mainly related to the radiation dose which might be received by a member of the public. For out of scope values the criteria adopted for artificial radionuclides are based on a radiation dose of 10 microsieverts per year to a member of the public. These dose criteria have been selected on the basis of representing an appropriate level of risk below which regulation is not necessary In this particular case disposal made historically by the MOD at Chatham would now meet the criteria for being out of scope of regulation and regulatory control. Radiation impact assessments conducted take into account a wide variety of possible pathways and assume that no controls are placed on the disposals. Therefore we do not need to revisit the MOD risk assessment at this time.      

In addition we have with discussed with MOD how these wastes were actually buried and 
ultimately capped when the site was closed. As your question also referred to the adequacy of controls it may be of interest to you that the disposal of what was then classified as Low Level Waste at the Chatham burial ground was subject to a number of conditions as stated in the approval certificate. These included a condition that the waste should be capped with at least 1.5 metres of non-radioactive earth and that the specific activity of the waste (and material used for capping) must not exceed 3000 micro curies per cubic metre (111 MBq/m3). These are similar regulatory requirements that would be placed on a landfill site receiving out of scope waste today and at the end of its life or when capping a completed landfill cell.

The site is still owned by MOD. We have not been involved in detailed discussions with the MOD over the future of this site or any redevelopment. At this time there is no further engagement expected between ourselves and the MOD. If the MOD were to sell this land then the impact of any redevelopment would be a matter for the developer. If approached we would recommend that the developer contacts the MOD for information on the material buried, location and radioactive inventory. Any redevelopment might then need to take account of the specific type of development. "

The Environment Agency is to be commended on providing this information in particular the 
information about risk and dose. It is worrying that at no stage did the MOD provide this 
information."

The EA is silent on the issue that Carbon 14 was disposed of  without proper consideration of the risks.  It is notable that the EA only had knowledge of carbon 2012




" We have recently (in 2012) been made aware of the presence of Carbon 14 and earlier this month (August)"

The MOD knew about the Carbon 14 in 2000


14 August the MOD was asked

" Dear Ministry of Defence, 

I note in a recent answer to an FOI MOD have stated that a maximum of 0.95 GBq of Carbon-14 was buried by the MOD at Chatham. 

Could you please provide me with details of the calculations and assumptions used to arrive a this figure and also information about the statistical uncertainty of the figure. 

Could you provide me with information about the updated risk assessment for the burial site to take account of Carbon 14. 

Could you provide information why Carbon 14 has not been included in the environmental survey reports.  

Also whether or not the MOD has now informed the Environment Agency that Carbon 14 was also disposed by burial at Chatham when the original agreement from the then HMIP was for Cobalt 60. 

Could you tell me if the MOD has provided any information about the radioactive waste burial site to the developers of the adjacent land. If so what information has been provided."

The latest reply from the MOD  9 September

"Your request is being dealt with under the terms of the Environmental Information 
Regulations (EIR) 2004. I can confirm that the Ministry of Defence does hold information 
within the scope of your request. The time limit for this request, however, needs to be 
extended from the initial 20 working days. Under the EIR, a public authority may extend 
this period if it reasonably believes that the complexity and volume of the information 
requested means that it is impracticable either to comply with the request within the earlier 
period or to make a decision to refuse to do so. In this case, I am writing to inform you, that 
we must extend the time limit for responding by a further 20 working days. I will write to 
you again no later than 7 October with a substantive response."

This calls into question the information provided by the EA because the MOD has provided no 
information on the  "details of the calculations and assumptions used to arrive a this figure and 
also information about the statistical uncertainty of the figure"

Tuesday, 16 April 2013

Contamination of fish catches in the Irish sea by Depleted Uranium Penetrators


Information  has  been released by the MOD in response to a FOI request asking

"Could you please provide me with Information including reports etc
about the object recovered by fishermen mentioned at para 3, D of
the DUFERC minutes dated 19/10 1999"

In response to this,  the MOD directed me to a reply they made to a similar request


Recovered DU penetrator


The information the MOD provided only relates to the physical characteristics of the recovered round. Of particular note  is the reference made to "black and friable DU oxide" indicating  a significant risk of loose DU contamination.


This DU penetrator was one of over 6000 lying on the seabed of the Irish Sea


"Some 6,907 shells have been fired into the Solway, and, even allowing for misfires and malfunctions, more than 6,000 are presumably now lying in the Solway. Many of us instinctively object to the Solway being used as a radioactive munitions dumping ground by the MOD."

The MOD have not provided any information about the potential doses and intakes of DU to the fishermen who recovered the round or any information about the extent to which the fish etc caught alongside the round were contaminated with DU or whether or not the catch was sold for human consumption.

The recovery of this DU penetrator begs the question how many other similar situations may have occurred, but where the presence of a DU penetrator in the catch was not recognised or reported.

The MOD in not providing information about dose estimates from the recovered DU penetrator seem to have been negligent in their duty of care to the fishermen who recovered the DU penetrator and the public who may have consumed the fish etc caught alongside the DU penetrator. 

Wednesday, 27 February 2013

Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator's annual report 2011


The Defence Nuclear safety Regulator (DNSR) have recently published their annual report for 2011 which includes a summary of nuclear and radiological safety and environmental protection performance in the Defence Nuclear Programme (DNP)

Key risks are :-

Red Risk

  • Lack of adequate resource to deliver the defence nuclear programmes safely.
  • Measures already in hand may be insufficient to address the present and predicted shortage of NSQEP in the Royal Navy, among MOD civilians and in defence contractors


Amber risk

  • Safety Cases in the DNP are inconsistent against current good practice; integration of safety analyses for the reactor and weapon needs to be expedited
  • The demonstration that the risk from DNP activities is ALARP is inconsistent and tortuous to uncover
  • The number of incidents remains too high


"Para 7: At least some of the Issues described further on have their roots in a general lack of resource to address the work required to conduct activities and demonstrate their safety."

This issue has been included as a red risk for years and it appears that no progress has been made to provide the required resources and if anything the situation is getting even worse year by year. DNSR appears powerless to ensure that Ministers and management to provide the resources necessary to safely deliver the MOD nuclear programmes.  

 It appears that only a serious incident would deliver an increase in resources.   This is what happened after  the Pochin enquiry in the late 1970s  following the discovery that 12 of those working at the Aldermarston appeared to have accumulated plutonium in their lungs in excess of the level recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection.  It was this that lead in a large part to the establishment of MOD professional Health Physicists as a separate grade within the MOD.

"Para15: Evidence continues to build that constraints on the DNP’s industrial funding are now affecting staffing levels in Tier 1 contractors; as a result projects run behind declared timetables and important safety submissions are delayed. The trend (of decades) to outsource work from MOD to industry when there are reductions in crown servant numbers (or the inability to recruit), may be approaching a real limit as industry is equally constrained. The limit may also result from the desire to maintain “crown control” of some activities, not least because safety legislation is applied differently (or exempted)  dependant on who is conducting the work."

Highlights the policy  of “crown control” under which the MOD nuclear operations remain largely exempt from civil nuclear regulation.  In the past outsourcing the work has allowed the MOD to meet staff reduction targets but it clear that the limit of this has now been reached if not exceeded.

"A number of incidents have occurred across the programme in 2011; individually they have not been of high significance or safety/environmental detriment, but taken together, they produce concern that working conditions and culture might not prevent an incident of higher significance"

DNSR highlights a worrying trend in incidents but these may well indicate the potential for a more significant incident with wider ranging consequences and may also be indicative of a safety/management culture under stress.

It is worrying that there are problems with integration of safety analyses for the reactor and weapon.  This suggests a "stove-pipe" approach to safety  and that there is insufficient consideration of the combined risks from all the hazards on the submarine, reactor, nuclear weapon, explosive, human factors and external hazards.  The report does not provide any information about what DNSR is doing to address this important issue.

Summary

The report clearly shows that the MOD lacks  adequate resources to deliver the defence nuclear programmes safely.  As far as can be seen DNSR  has been ineffective in persuading management and Ministers to provide the necessary resource.
  
It is also notable that DNSR has not issued any enforcement notices requiring the provision of the necessary resources deliver the defence nuclear programmes safely
. 
It  is also of interesting to see in  DNSRs report,  concerns expressed  about the difficulty in establishing of DNSR’s full complement of human resources in DSEA with the potential to impact on DNSRs' ability to regulate.

The report suggests the probability of a serious incident within MOD nuclear programmes continues to increase.

Friday, 27 April 2012

Chatham an urban nuclear waste dump and a lasting legacy of the nuclear submarine programme


Background


Chatham Dockyard played a key part in the United Kingdom’s nuclear propulsion programme. Refitting and refueling of nuclear submarines was carried out at Chatham from 1970 until March 1983.  These activities gave rise to radioactive waste which had to be disposed of.  Higher activity wastes were disposed of to BNFL Sellafield in Cumbria. However some of the lower activity wastes were disposed of by local burial within the Dockyard site.  This was done with the agreement of the Regulator HMIP (reference 1) on the assumption the waste contained short lived Cobalt 60 which would decay away over a period of 20 to 30 years. In interesting note that in an answer to a PQ about radioactive waste arrangements at Chatham, there was no mention of the disposal of radioactive waste by burial at Chatham. Hansard (26 Nov 2002: Column 172W)


More about the history of refitting and nuclear work at Chatham Dockyard


Amount of waste buried


Approximately 300 cubic meters of radioactive waste was buried between 1968 and 1986 - reference 2


Risk assessment


Reference 6  to quote the MOD “The risk assessment for the disposal of radioactive waste by burial Chatham - It has not been possible to locate this information, it would have predated the approvals granted by the Department of the Environment in 1980 and has not been located in any of the files recovered”.   This is a significant failure in the MOD’s corporate memory.


Cobalt 60 and Carbon 14 


Cobalt 60 has a short half live of around 6 years, so that after about 24 years the amount of radioactivity will have fallen by approximately 93%. It was on this basis that it was considered safe to dispose of the waste by local burial.


However it came to light that nuclear waste arising from the submarine programme also contains significant amounts of Carbon 14 with a half life of 5,700 years. This issue was picked up by the Governments Independent Advisory Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (RWMAC) in their 2001 report on the Ministry of Defence radioactive waste management practices. Reference 3, 4.  DRPS estimates of carbon 14 in wastes arsing form the naval nuclear prolusion programme can be found at reference 5 paragraphs J and K.


Monitoring


Reference 7:  the attached MOD letter dated 13 October 2008 clearly shows that whilst environmental monitoring for Cobalt 60 was being carried out, it was not for Carbon14. This despite the knowledge dating back to 2001 that Carbon14 may be present.


Burial site


It is notable that the burial site remains MOD property this suggests that  the risks from the buried waste are not insignificant.  The site is walled off by a 3 metre high wall, whilst the site its self has reverted to scrub and woodland.


Google Earth view showing the dump site at Chatham out-lined in red
As can be seen from the image above the burial site the immediate area is undergoing extensive redevelopment including the water-front, a new marina and housing etc.






View of the dump site from Pier Approach Road the dump is behind the wall and appears to be heavily wooded




Conclusion



  • The assumption that Cobalt 60 was only significant radionuclide present in the waste buried at Chatham was mostly likely wrong.
  • The non-availability of a risk assessment or safety case for the burials a Chatham is a serious failing of corporate memory and does little to engender public confidence in the MODs ability to manage the safety of legacy issues over the medium and long term.
  • In the absence of any available safety case, the MOD in conjunction with the Environment Agency needs to publish a revised safety case for the burial site to take account of the presence of Carbon 14 in the waste. The safety case should also demonstrate that the burial meets current standards and regulatory requirements to ensure both environmental and human safety. If this cannot be done to the satisfaction of stakeholders and the Regulators serious consideration must be given to remediation of the site.
  • The situation at Chatham does little to improve public confidence in the Governments policy and the NDAs strategy for managing radioactively waste nationally and the MOD in particular. It remains to be seen how the MOD will respond to issues surrounding the waste dump at Chatham, but if Dalgety Bay is an indicator, the signs for speedy action are not good.



References


1: HMIP agreement to dispose of radioactive waste by burial 
2: MOD letter dated July 1987
3: RWMAC report on the MODs’ radioactive waste management practices 2001 - Carbon14 paragraphs 6.52 to 6.62
4:  MOD response to RWMAC regarding Carbon 14
5: DRPS estimates of Carbon14 in waste streams arising from the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Programme paragraphs J and K
6: Letter dated 7 August 2009 from MOD providing information on burials of radioactive waste at Chatham
7: Letter dated Medway Council dated 29 May 2009 with attached letter from MOD dated 13 October 2008

Monday, 5 December 2011

MOD policy on contaminated land and alienated sites


In response to a FOI request about how MOD responded to the recommendations contained in the 2000 report by RWMAC    “RWMAC's Advice to Ministers on The Ministry of Defence's Arrangements for Dealing with Radioactively Contaminated Land“. It is clear from the response to action 12 that the MOD has no intention of identifying  what contamination exists on land that it has disposed of prior to the LQA programme such as Dalgety Bay.  


It is also clear from the response to action 12 of the RWMAC report that MOD believes this responsibility lies with Local Authorities.  Local Authorities hold few if any records that would assist them in identifying contamination on former MOD sites let alone the financial resources to support such activity.  


I believe it is important for the safety of the environment and the public, that risks from defence related pollutants are identified and if necessary remediated.  Examples of such pollutants are :-
  • radioactive substances such as  radium, 
  • chemical weapon residues such as mustard gas, 
  • asbestos, 
  • organic solvents, 
  • explosives and ammunition
  • toxic heavy metals such as mercury, lead and cadmium 
I also believe that it is the MODs’  responsibility to  identify where there is a legacy of pollution from defence activities  and where identified as the polluter, MOD should pay to for any clean up rather that  pushing off the responsibility onto poorly resourced local authorities  and council tax payers and Regulators 


RWMAC ACTION PLAN page 3 


Action 12
“MOD should give thought to the feasibility of compiling information on disposals of land predating the LQA programme, where radioactive contamination might have been involved.”


MOD response 


“The introduction of EPA 1990 Part 2A places the responsibility for inspecting land with the local authority to identify land contamination.”

Friday, 2 April 2010

MoD's internal regulator condemned military's plans as 'flawed, inaccurate and outdated'

This Guardian article “MoD's internal regulator condemned military's plans as 'flawed, inaccurate and outdated' with interest.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/mar/31/nuclear-subs-dnsr

I make the following observations. The situation reported in the Guardian may reflect on a lack of resources and in particular the impact successive budget cuts and the difficulty in retaining suitable qualified professional staff. As long ago as 2003 The MOD recognised this problem in the “DEFENCE ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY REPORT 2003-2004”

http://tinyurl.com/yjuhyhz

“Risk 5. NUCLEAR SKILLS SHORTAGE: Effect: Insufficient qualified and experienced personnel to support the Defence Nuclear Programmes. Likelihood: Medium, Impact: Inability to sustain aspects of the Defence nuclear outputs. Risk Category: Personnel, Reputation, Operational”

It seems the short-comings highlighted in the DNSR Review might in part be due to these shortages of staff and resources identified in the DESB report. The shortages of skilled professional staff are likely to increase as the civil nuclear programme begins to accelerate drawing skilled staff away from the Defence sector

The recent budgetary situation in MOD has received coverage in the press and there will be significant cuts in the near future which may serve to cause even greater difficulties in funding and staffing.

It seems sensible therefore for MOD to move to a system of civil regulation which would engender far greater public confidence in the safety of its naval nuclear operations. MOD has recognised this; in the licensing of the Atomic weapon Establishments under the Nuclear Installations Act and as a matter of policy in the “ANNUAL REPORT TO THE DEFENCE ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY BOARD 2000/01”

http://tinyurl.com/yfr44jy

“MOD accepts that, where it is practicable, demonstrating openness and transparency and building confidence will best be achieved by compliance with the civil regulatory regime and the Department has agreed to consider further moves in that direction.”

It is interesting to note that the “ANNUAL REPORT ON SAFETY, HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN MOD 2004/5” was much shorter than previous reports and failed to include any reference to nuclear safety; and so far as I can determine from the MOD website that no further annual report to the DESB has been published.

http://tinyurl.com/yzxsye9

Perhaps the time has come to consider the affordability of MOD nuclear programmes and whether they can be resourced to conform to civil safety standards.