Astute - no investigation of the root causes of the problems recently reported in the Guardian

In response to a FOI request the MOD has admitted the MOD has not carried any analysis of the root causes that that lead to problems on the Astute class submarines and  that this was at least in part due to the collective loss of experience. 

This raises serious questions as to the safety of the MODs' nuclear submarine programme, the effectiveness of the MOD management systems and in particular the effectiveness of the MOD's internal Nuclear Regulator  and the  Defence Nuclear Safety Committee; it may only be luck that a serious incident has not yet happened.  

This situation would certainly not be allowed to develop in the civil sector which is subject to independent regulation by the Office of Nuclear Regulation. 
.

Original FOI request 29 December 2012

Reply from the MOD dated 4th February 2013

"Request for Information under the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act 2000  

Further to my letter of 28 January 2013, I am writing to provide a substantive response to your request for the following information: 

The Guardian recently revealed problems with the Astute nuclear submarine, which is 
coming to the end of three years of sea trials. 

Rear Admiral Lister is quoted as saying that "he had identified three sorts of problems with the Astute: 

a: flaws in design that only became apparent when testing started; 

b: equipment that broke down too easily; 

c: and some problems relating to poor construction at the shipyard."" 

Could you please provide me with information about the root causes of these problems. 

I can confirm that the MOD does not hold any information within the scope of your request.  This is because no analysis of problems on the Astute class submarines, nor any of the other lessons learning processes undertaken on the Astute programme, have categorised problems in the exact terms you describe in your request.  In his interview with the Guardian, Rear Admiral Lister was providing an engineer’s assessment of the generic problems experienced during the early phase of the Astute build programme, and not seeking to quote the formal lessons learning work that has taken place. 

Outside the scope of the FOI Act I should like to add that the most significant factor in the problems that have occurred in the Astute programme is the collective loss of experience of designing and building nuclear submarines owing to the long gap between the construction of the last of the Vanguard class (HMS Vengeance) and the start of the construction of HMS Astute."

Dalgety Bay the MOD is unable to locate records about the sale of radioactively contaminated land and the local Community Council appeals to the public for their help.

"Dalgety Bay & Hillend Community Council

See the item of 3 October for details of what has prompted this reply
The Chairman writes: A reply from Moray Estates indicates that "They being professionally advised, could equally assume that had clear and accurate information been passed over relating to the exact nature and content of the salvage area in question then, it would be unlikely the Estate would have completed the purchase".

On this reply PLEASE NOTE THAT IF ANYBODY IN THE LOCAL AREA HAS KNOWLEDGE OF ANY OPERATIONS PARTICULARY IN RESPECT OF DONIBRISTLE AIRFIELD ON INCINERATION, DUMPING OF MATERIAL OR OTHER WORKS IN RELATION TO THE FORESHORE IN DALGETY BAY DURING THE 1950'S AND 1960'S, PLEASE CONTACT THE CHAIRMAN cmcphail.oceanwheels@btinternet.com or tel  01383 823750. 

YOU MAY HAVE IMPORTANT INFORMATION WE CAN SEND TO THE MOD AND SEPA."

Letter from MOD to Colin McPhail MBE leader of Hillend Community Council

Dear Mr McPhail,

DALGETY BAY FORESHORE RADIATION

Thank you for your letter of the 6 August 2012. I can confirm that a copy was forwarded to the Rt Hon Andrew Robathan, whilst he was still the Minister for Defence Pensions, Welfare and Veterans, as you requested. Please accept my apologies for the delay in confirming this and for replying to your letter.

As you will be aware we are now in the process of finalising arrangements to commence Stage 2 of the Investigation Plan and hope to have everything agreed ready to start in October. This will include engaging with residents, and I would like to thank you for your offer of assistance. I understand that my officials have already been in touch in this regard.

With regard to the sale of the former RNAS Donibristle, it is unfortunate that  we have not been able to establish the exact details of the documentation which was provided as part of the sale. We cannot therefore, comment on whether or not the information in question was passed across. What is certain is that we would have complied with the practice and legal requirements of the day. Given the fact that the salvage section was still present at the time of sale, combined with the breadth of the proposal put forward by the Moray Estates Development Company in respect of the site, it would seem fair to assume that they had a detailed knowledge of the site before committing to its purchase.

Returning to the Investigation Plan, we remain committed to delivering the investigation in order to assist SEPA to determine the nature and extent of the problem and what needs to be done to ensure the protection of the local community.

Again, please accept my apologies for the delay in responding.

Yours sincerely,

Mark Hutchinson
Chief Operating Officer
Defence Infrastructure Organisation
DESK 9, LEVEL 5 ZONE A, MOD MAIN BUILDING , WHITEHALL, LONDON, SW1A 2HB
MOD telephone: 9621 78294
Telephone:   0207 807 8294    0207 807 8294?
Fax:   0207 218 2470    0207 218 2470
Email: DIO-COSOpspport@mod.uk
Website


The letter makes it clear that the MOD assumed that it would seem fair to assume that the Moray Estates Development Company had a detailed knowledge of the site before committing to its purchase. This is clearly an attempt to shift liability away from the MOD onto the Moray Estates Development Company.   The MOD has not given in the letter any evidence to back up this assumption. It also calls into question how many other situations there are, where the MOD has sold land  making the same assumption.



DALGETY BAY FORESHORE RADIATION  e-petition

WHAT CAN YOU DO?

You can sign our official UK Goverment e-petition, and you can join our email campaign. Please do both! Urge everyone you meet to do the same

"I respectfully ask the Ministry of Defence and Scottish Environment Protection Agency to state that remedial work on the contaminated foreshore area in Dalgety Bay will begin immediately after the investigation plan is satisfactorily completed and that those deemed responsible for the contamination will fund the work and have it completed by the end of 2013"

DU Firing programme at Eskmeals - As Low As reasonably Practical ?

Reference 1

Looking back to the UK depleted uranium firing programme and in particular the firings carried out Eskmeals on the west Cumbrian coast. It is interesting to consider to what extent these firing complied with the duty to restrict exposures to as low as level as reasonably practical (ALARP).  

The  IRR99 and the IRR85 requires employers to keep exposure to ionising radiation as low as reasonably practicable. 

VJ Battery at Eskemals in the early years was essentially a traditional open butt with the addition of a roof and extract ventilation from each side of the butt. this allowed the spray back of aerosolised DU and fragements through the open air onto a apron in front of the butt.

To quote from the reports :-

 Safety Services Organisation MOD(PE) November 1983, The distribution of Depleted Uranium releases at P&&EE Eskmeals, excluding appendices.

Report summarising the measurements taken at VJ Butt P&EE Eskmeals of Depleted Uranium in air during the period 1981 to 1982.

"The penetrator on impacting with the target produced pyrophoric fragments which rapidly disintegrate and. there is a spray back-up the range over an angle of 20 degrees  for a distance of 60 metres."

"Total activity in air measurements taken outside the butt indicate that DU is being released to the environment at levels above the DAC for a period of time after firing. It is not possible to quantify the amounts.".   DAC "Derived Air Concentration" ICRP 30

"The DU dust was found to be well within the respirable size range, dust particles of this size have very long settling times and can remain airborne  for very long periods of time and if allowed to disperse from the butt may travel many hundreds of meters."

This is the  Department of Defense Superbox DU firing facility at Aberdeen Proving Ground Maryland USA. As can be seen the facility offers almost complete containment. It includes a flight tunnel with a drop down door.  The Superbox facility is seen as an example of a facility that reduces exposures to the public and workers outside the facility to a level that is  ALARP

The conclusion is that  that in the early years of the firing programme the MOD failed to meet its legal duty to restrict exposures to as low as level as reasonably practical. It is also interesting to consider that that the VJ Battery at Eskmeals was probably very quick and cheap to build compared to the Superbox facility in the USA. 

It is now also clear that the MOD failed to seek letters of agreement from the Environment Agency for the discharge of DU to atmosphere from VJ Battery at Eskmeals. This was in breach of the MODs' own policies.

Later years of the firing programme at Eskmeals

DRPS Report "Comparison of Kirkcudbright and Eskmeals Environmental Monitoring Data with Generalised Derived Limits for Uranium" June 2002 mentions that a tunnel was added to the face of VJ Butt in order to reduce discharges of DU to the environment. This acknowledged that the original firings at VJ did not comply with the requirement to restrict exposures to as low as level as reasonably practical.

References

1: HSE Reducing risks protecting people 2001

Unregulated discharge of Depleted Uranium to the environment

Thank you for your enquiry dated 21 September 2012. This has been dealt with under the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act 2000.

You asked for: 

 "letters of agreement from the Environment Agency and its predecessor organisations for  the MOD to discharge of depleted uranium to the environment from Eskmeals and  letters of agreement from the Scottish Environment Protection Agency and its predecessor organisations for the MOD to discharge of depleted uranium to the environment from  Kirkcudbright." 

"I am writing to advise you that the information you requested is not held.  There is no licensing as such of the Ministry of Defence's depleted uranium firing activities. The  procedure adopted at the outset of the depleted uranium trials programme, which is still in force, is  for regulatory authorities with Health and Safety and Environmental Protection responsibilities to  be involved in the design of the safety arrangements and to visit the sites as and when they wish."

In the case of Kirkcudbright some 6,907 shells have been fired into the Solway Hansard and  there appears to be no accurate figures for the amount of DU dispersed to the environment at Eskmeals. 

JSP 392 Vol 2,  Leaflet 30  "DEPLETED URANIUM" states that there are so far as the Radioactive Substances Act 1993 (RSA93)  is concerned there are parallel arrangements, this being the case there should be letters of agreement from the environmental regulators for the discharge of depleted uranium to the environment.  The response to the FOI request shows that none were obtained  and the discharges were unregulated. 

It may be that the MOD felt that it would be pointless to seek letters of agreement form the environmental Regulators as they were unlikely to agree to the discharges and so far as the MOD were concerned it was fortunate that the RSA93 does not apply to the MOD. 

The response to this FOI request clearly shows the MOD failed to meet its own policy to seek letters of agreement from the environmental  Regulators  when discharging substantial quantities of radioactive substances into the environment.  

Extract from JSP 392 Vol 2,  Leaflet 30  "DEPLETED URANIUM" 


"3 In addition to the general requirements of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 and the 
Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999, the following specific legislation applies 
directly or is applied indirectly through parallel arrangements designed to achieve equivalent standards: 
• Ionising Radiations Regulations 1999 (IRR99) (apply directly). 
• Radioactive Substances Act 1993 (RSA93) (parallel arrangements)"



References

MOU between the MOD and Environment Agency

Dalgety Bay on-shore Radium Contamination

Recent press reports about Dalgety bay featuring interviews with Gordon Brown speaking about the ”new” discovery of particles of radioactive onshore at Crowhill wood should not ellicit any surprise, it appears that Gordon Brown is playing  catch-up. 


Links to recent press reports

• Courier
• STV including video
• Fife Today
• Link to a 2008 press report  before the Enviros report was published 

It’s clear from a report that MOD commissioned Enviros to produce in 2009 that the possibility of onshore contamination was an issue. The report  describes on-shore contamination including investigations of domestic properties and gardens built over the former RNAS/RAF Donibristle salvage area in the 1960s.  This and associated reports were released by Defence Estates in response to a FOI request made 2010.


Extract from the Enviros report describing areas surveyed inshore from the beach


Link to full report


“Investigation Works Undertaken


8.  As a result of the data from the first Phase Two LQA and in particular the findings relating to Property D in Zone 2A, a further phase of investigations were undertaken. The site works involved both radiological walkover surveys and intrusive investigation, the areas investigated are summarised below (Zone designation used in original Phase Two LQA are shown in brackets):

• Dalgety Bay Sailing Club Boat Park (Zone 1): Radiological walkover survey of northern area where access was previously not possible;
• Property A in Zone 2A and Properties H & I in Zone 4B: Radiological walkover survey and random soil sampling from two properties in Zone 4B.
• Radiological walkover survey and random soil sampling from one property in Zone 2A which had not allowed access during the original Phase Two LQA.
• Former Salvage Section (Zone 2A): 1m by 1m gridded radiological walkover surveys and soil sampling in the garden areas of six properties. Where radium-226 and elevated count rates were identified removal of disseminated contamination and point sources was undertaken where possible.
• Internal Monitoring: Count and dose rate surveys covering accessible areas of the ground floor of six properties on the former Salvage Section and the sailing club house. A similar property outside the impacted area was also surveyed to provide a typical background for the developments which could be used as a comparison.”

Link to full report


Reference: 


DALGETY BAY LAND QUALITY ASSESSMENT PHASE 2B: INTRUSIVE INVESTIGATION AND INTERVENTION LAND QUALITY ASSESSMENT REPORT – FINAL V1 DEFENCE ESTATES, PROJECT NO: 12920, TECHNICAL REPORT, November 2009, by Enviros Consulting.  

The failing regime for managing contaminated land.

RNAS/RAF Pulham  provides a typical  example of a site potentially  contaminated with Radium 


The Government recently introduced a new regime for the management of contaminated land to protect both man and the environment.   Recent FOIs have been asked, to try to establish the extent of the  hazards and risk  arsing from historic contamination due to use of  radium as a luminising agent by the Ministry of Defence.  This issue was also subject to a detailed review by the Governments Radioactive Waste management Advisory committee (RWMAC).


The recent  concerns  about this  legacy of  radium contamination  and the potential risk to the public and environment has been highlighted by  the  discovery  that the beach at Dalgety Bay is far more extensively contaminated than previously thought  and the MODs extreme reluctance to admit liability. The MOD has also released a list of some of the sites where radium contamination is an issue.


What has become clear that MOD has little if any records about radium contamination for those parts of the defence estate disposed of between the end of the Second World War and the 1980s. What records that do exist are mainly clearance certificates which were concerned about unexploded ordnance and explosives and not with other contaminates such as Radium, heavy metals, asbestos, chemical weaopns or organic solvents.


In response to an FOI  it is clear With introduction of the contaminated land regime that the MOD policy is :- 


“The site was despised of in the early 1960s and predates the MOD Land Quality Assessment programme. The MOD there only holds the enclosed 1969 Clearance Certificate that might be relevant to your request.


I am advised that former sites such as this fall within the statutory responsibility of the Local authority to inspect the land in its area and identify any contaminated land. It is therefore suggested that any evidence of contamination you have should be brought to the attention of the Local Authority “


This effectively shuffles off any responsibility to identify contaminated land that the MOD once owned or controlled to the Local Authorities.  Local Authorities are very unlikely to hold any information about these sites and therefore are unlikely to have the means to identify whether or not such land is contaminated.  


It is clear that with the need to find cost savings MOD has lost the capability to assist local authorities in identifying contaminated defence land.  MOD may have  transferred information that would have helped to the National Archive or the information may have been lost or destroyed. 

I asked the Local Authority  “Could you please provide me with information about the nature and extent of radium contamination at RNAS/RAF Pulham in Norfolk Lat 52° 24.690'N long 1° 14.011'E”


“The historic past use by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) of part of the site many years ago for aircraft breaking raises the possibility of radium 226 contamination. The nature and extent of any possible contamination is being considered but formal investigations which require detailed planning have yet to be instigated. The Council is actively working with the Environment Agency, Health Protection Agency, MOD and others within the legal framework from government to clarify what action is appropriate to investigate the possibility of contamination.” 




The Wikipedia entry for RNAS/RAF Pulham says  “During World War II, Pulham Air Station was used as an aircraft salvage yard for the East of England, with several huge dumps of scrapped aircraft. The resultant contamination of the land is visible even today. The RAF used Pulham for storage and Maintenance Unit work until closure in 1958.” This activity appears to very similar to that at RNAS Donnibristle  which may have lead to the contamination of Dalgety Bay with Radium.

Conclusion


The lack of information to identify whether or radium contamination is present means that only a very expensive physical survey will provide an answer.
  
The lesson to be learnt is that it is important to retain knowledge and information over long periods of time if you wish to answer questions of liability and risk.

Sunday Herald report “Revealed: the catalogue of chronic safety blunders at Scotland’s nuclear navy bases

Sunday Herald report “Revealed: the catalogue of chronic safety blunders at Scotland’s nuclear navy bases”

“The Ministry of Defence is struggling to deal with hundreds of safety blunders, pollution leaks and environmental lapses at nuclear weapons bases on the Firth of Clyde. Official reports obtained by the Sunday Herald reveal that Faslane and Coulport have been plagued by nuclear accidents, radioactive contamination and fires over the last two years. Worryingly, there have been unspecified “shortfalls” in the safe management of nuclear bombs. And rules meant to protect people against asbestos and even Legionnaires’ disease have been frequently broken. The Government’s safety watchdogs have also warned that unless millions of pounds are invested in replacing the ageing radioactive waste plant at Faslane, it will no longer be safe in four years’ time. That will add to the multi-billion pound bill for keeping nuclear weapons in Scotland, critics say.”

Full story at
http://tinyurl.com/2wnw3ue and http://tinyurl.com/2w2q5pc

If accurate this article raises a number of questions. Firstly, shortfalls in radioactive waste management were highlighted as long ago as 2001 by RWMAC in their independent review of MOD radioactive waste management practices; it seems that very little has been done to implement their recommendations. It also seems that another independent review of MOD radioactive waste management practices is long overdue.

http://tinyurl.com/33f2bdp

The sorts of safety and environment failings highlighted in the article may indicate weaknesses in the safety culture on sites associated with the naval nuclear programme. It is interesting to compare these with those highlighted in the reports into the explosion and fire at Texas City Oil refinery USA and to what extent cultural and organisational similarities exist between BP and the MOD.

http://tinyurl.com/pe2qan

http://www.hse.gov.uk/leadership/bakerreport.pdf

It is also worth considering to what extent improvements in safety and environmental performance might be delivered if the Naval Nuclear programme and facilities were subject to civil regulation under the NIA and RSA rather than the current system of internal regulation. There may be significant cost savings for tax payer and MOD since there would no longer be a need to fund the system of internal Regulation; the urgent need to find savings within Government budgets would seem to encourage this.

The case for civil regulation was put by RWMAC in their 2001 report, recommending that:-
“Irrespective of MoD's assurance and, where necessary, its own regulatory arrangements, RWMAC believes that, as an overriding general principle, the benefits of civil regulation in helping to maintain operational standards, and in promoting assurance and transparency, are not in doubt. Thus, there should be a presumption that civil regulation should, as far as is reasonably practicable, be applied to MoD nuclear and radioactive waste management activities. Where there is a case for not doing so, this should be clearly set down and justified”

And further recommend that:-

“Subject only to real security considerations, the principles of openness and transparency should be taken as far as is reasonably practicable to help promote public confidence in the safety of MoD's nuclear and radioactive waste management operations”.