How Britain risked triggering nuclear Armageddon

Readers may remember media interest in operation "Able Archer"

The Guardian reported "Cabinet memos and briefing papers released under the Freedom of 
Information Act reveal that a major war games exercise, Operation Able Archer, conducted in 
November 1983 by the US and its Nato allies was so realistic it made the Russians believe that a nuclear strike on its territory was a real possibility."

It is therefore interesting to note that 20 years before a similar situation occurred in Britain a the height of the Cuban missile crisis when the world was on the brink of nuclear Armageddon.
Scott D Sagan in his book "The Limits of Safety"  describes how  in the early hours  of the 27th of October 1962 the Commander in Chief (Air Marshall Cross)  decided without reference to civilian political authorities  to raise the alert level of the British nuclear forces to " full operational capability" able to launch within fifteen minutes or less against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.  It is even suggested that the Prime Minister was unaware of the situation. Senior civilian officials  had warned that such mobilizations had sometimes caused war.

The "Able Archer" exercise suggests that the lessons of 1962 had not been learnt and what reason do we have to believe that they have been learnt today.   Sufficient to say that human factors must be at the heart of nuclear safety both civil and military. 

 It is also worthy of note that the operational aspects of the British nuclear weapons programme are only subject to MOD internal regulation rather than independent regulation by the Health and Safety Executive. So both the public and Parliament have to take on trust that operational aspects of the British nuclear weapon programme are being properly managed and safety standards maintained.  

It is worth remembering  that the MOD is and will continue to be subject to deep and damaging 
cuts; how will these impact on the safety ?

Extract from The Limits of Safety - British Alerting Actions

File lists - key to accessing corporate memory

FOI dated 19th February 2013

“Please could you provide me with the following registry file lists used by :- 

•  D Sef Pol 
•  D Def H&S 
•  DS&C”

Answer 12 March 2013

"However, we have to advise you that we will not be able to answer your request without  exceeding the appropriate limit. This is because to the only official record of registered files  is the MOD Form 262 of which there is one form for each file and part of a file opened.  There are many thousands of MOD Form 262s which make up the official file record for D Def H&S and D SEF Pol and to locate, retrieve, and extract information in scope of your request would involve some 7 man days of effort"

The answer implies that there are significant difficulties in locating files in order to inform policy and questions about issues, some only a few years old.  D Sef pol, D Def H&S and DS&C  were in turn all Directorates of MOD Head Office concerned with health, safety and the environment.  The difficulty in accessing  files means that it is very difficult to look back and learn from  previous accidents and polluting events.  So, such unfortunate incidents are likely to reoccur.

It also means that there will be problems finding and checking information used to inform the answers to Parliamentary questions, FOI requests, and  to defend claims against the MOD etc.  

File lists are also required in order to access archived files, in the absence of file lists historic information is inaccessible.  

The lack of file lists has led  to "corporate amnesia"

A previous post to this blog also points out in the clearest terms that MOD has failed to ensure the retention of key information for the period  1975 to 1985 about the way in which radioactive waste has been managed and disposed of. It may also mean that key information about policy and standards may have been lost 

Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator's annual report 2011

The Defence Nuclear safety Regulator (DNSR) have recently published their annual report for 2011 which includes a summary of nuclear and radiological safety and environmental protection performance in the Defence Nuclear Programme (DNP)

Key risks are :-

Red Risk

• Lack of adequate resource to deliver the defence nuclear programmes safely.
• Measures already in hand may be insufficient to address the present and predicted shortage of NSQEP in the Royal Navy, among MOD civilians and in defence contractors

Amber risk

• Safety Cases in the DNP are inconsistent against current good practice; integration of safety analyses for the reactor and weapon needs to be expedited
• The demonstration that the risk from DNP activities is ALARP is inconsistent and tortuous to uncover
• The number of incidents remains too high

"Para 7: At least some of the Issues described further on have their roots in a general lack of resource to address the work required to conduct activities and demonstrate their safety."

This issue has been included as a red risk for years and it appears that no progress has been made to provide the required resources and if anything the situation is getting even worse year by year. DNSR appears powerless to ensure that Ministers and management to provide the resources necessary to safely deliver the MOD nuclear programmes.  

 It appears that only a serious incident would deliver an increase in resources.   This is what happened after  the Pochin enquiry in the late 1970s  following the discovery that 12 of those working at the Aldermarston appeared to have accumulated plutonium in their lungs in excess of the level recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection.  It was this that lead in a large part to the establishment of MOD professional Health Physicists as a separate grade within the MOD.

"Para15: Evidence continues to build that constraints on the DNP’s industrial funding are now affecting staffing levels in Tier 1 contractors; as a result projects run behind declared timetables and important safety submissions are delayed. The trend (of decades) to outsource work from MOD to industry when there are reductions in crown servant numbers (or the inability to recruit), may be approaching a real limit as industry is equally constrained. The limit may also result from the desire to maintain “crown control” of some activities, not least because safety legislation is applied differently (or exempted)  dependant on who is conducting the work."

Highlights the policy  of “crown control” under which the MOD nuclear operations remain largely exempt from civil nuclear regulation.  In the past outsourcing the work has allowed the MOD to meet staff reduction targets but it clear that the limit of this has now been reached if not exceeded.

"A number of incidents have occurred across the programme in 2011; individually they have not been of high significance or safety/environmental detriment, but taken together, they produce concern that working conditions and culture might not prevent an incident of higher significance"

DNSR highlights a worrying trend in incidents but these may well indicate the potential for a more significant incident with wider ranging consequences and may also be indicative of a safety/management culture under stress.

It is worrying that there are problems with integration of safety analyses for the reactor and weapon.  This suggests a "stove-pipe" approach to safety  and that there is insufficient consideration of the combined risks from all the hazards on the submarine, reactor, nuclear weapon, explosive, human factors and external hazards.  The report does not provide any information about what DNSR is doing to address this important issue.

Summary

The report clearly shows that the MOD lacks  adequate resources to deliver the defence nuclear programmes safely.  As far as can be seen DNSR  has been ineffective in persuading management and Ministers to provide the necessary resource.
  
It is also notable that DNSR has not issued any enforcement notices requiring the provision of the necessary resources deliver the defence nuclear programmes safely
. 
It  is also of interesting to see in  DNSRs report,  concerns expressed  about the difficulty in establishing of DNSR’s full complement of human resources in DSEA with the potential to impact on DNSRs' ability to regulate.

The report suggests the probability of a serious incident within MOD nuclear programmes continues to increase.

HMS Tireless - leak in reactor compartment

Daily Express reports

"Launched in 1984 “HMS Tired”, as she has been dubbed, was due to be decommissioned from the fleet this year but her service was extended for another four years due to the delay in the rollout of the new Astute class submarines

A Royal Navy spokesman said: “HMS Tireless returned to Devonport Naval Base last week for repair following a small coolant leak that was contained within the sealed reactor compartment. There is no risk to the public, the environment or the crew.” 

Whilst this may be true, the leak may be indicative of an ageing boat reaching the end of its life. 

The decision to extend its service calls in to question to what extent the granting of the extension of service is at the price of an increased risk to safety.

This incident shows that the problems encountered with commissioning the Astute submarines are having a knock on effect on nuclear safety of the older submarines that were due to have been decommissioned.

This blog has already reported the MODs failure to identify the root causes of the problems with HMS Astute.  It will interesting to see if the MOD publishes any information about the causes of the leak of coolant within the reactor compartment of HMS Tireless.

It is worth considering to what extent other submarines of the same class and age as HMS Tireless might now be prone to the same sort of leak or indeed a more serious leak that might endanger the submarine.

It should be remembered that this is not the first time HMS Tireless has suffered collant leaks, in May 2000, Tireless developed a serious leak in the nuclear reactor primary cooling circuit. The nuclear propulsion system was shut down and using backup diesel power Tireless made way to Gibraltar. The damage was found to be more extensive than first thought, and the boat remained at Gibraltar, creating diplomatic tensions between Spain and Britain, until she left on 7 May 2001, nearly a year later following extensive repairs During that year, all Trafalgar-class submarines were inspected for similar problems

More recent report

Astute - no investigation of the root causes of the problems recently reported in the Guardian

In response to a FOI request the MOD has admitted the MOD has not carried any analysis of the root causes that that lead to problems on the Astute class submarines and  that this was at least in part due to the collective loss of experience. 

This raises serious questions as to the safety of the MODs' nuclear submarine programme, the effectiveness of the MOD management systems and in particular the effectiveness of the MOD's internal Nuclear Regulator  and the  Defence Nuclear Safety Committee; it may only be luck that a serious incident has not yet happened.  

This situation would certainly not be allowed to develop in the civil sector which is subject to independent regulation by the Office of Nuclear Regulation. 
.

Original FOI request 29 December 2012

Reply from the MOD dated 4th February 2013

"Request for Information under the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act 2000  

Further to my letter of 28 January 2013, I am writing to provide a substantive response to your request for the following information: 

The Guardian recently revealed problems with the Astute nuclear submarine, which is 
coming to the end of three years of sea trials. 

Rear Admiral Lister is quoted as saying that "he had identified three sorts of problems with the Astute: 

a: flaws in design that only became apparent when testing started; 

b: equipment that broke down too easily; 

c: and some problems relating to poor construction at the shipyard."" 

Could you please provide me with information about the root causes of these problems. 

I can confirm that the MOD does not hold any information within the scope of your request.  This is because no analysis of problems on the Astute class submarines, nor any of the other lessons learning processes undertaken on the Astute programme, have categorised problems in the exact terms you describe in your request.  In his interview with the Guardian, Rear Admiral Lister was providing an engineer’s assessment of the generic problems experienced during the early phase of the Astute build programme, and not seeking to quote the formal lessons learning work that has taken place. 

Outside the scope of the FOI Act I should like to add that the most significant factor in the problems that have occurred in the Astute programme is the collective loss of experience of designing and building nuclear submarines owing to the long gap between the construction of the last of the Vanguard class (HMS Vengeance) and the start of the construction of HMS Astute."

Astute " teething troubles"

The Guardian recently revealed problems with the  Astute nuclear submarine, which is coming to the end of three years of sea trials.

In the subsequent article in the Guardian Rear Admiral Lister is quoted as saying

"it would be wrong for the military to claim the difficulties were just "stuff and nonsense and teething troubles",but he also  said it would also be wrong for critics to write off what is the navy's most technically advanced boat."

I think the truth lies between these two positions

Rear Admiral Lister is also quoted as saying that  "he had identified three sorts of problems with the Astute:

• flaws in design that only became apparent when testing started;
• equipment that broke down too easily;
• and some problems relating to poor construction at the shipyard.""

What the Guardian article does not explain are the root causes that lead to these problems. It would be most interesting to know to what extent continuous organisational change together with  budget cuts within the MOD played a part; on this both the Guardian and the MOD are silent.

Non SQEP staff in SQEP Posts

On the 23rd of October MOD was requested to provide information about suitably qualified and experienced (SQEP)  personnel  who provide key support to safe delivery  MOD nuclear Programmes. 


The number of non-MOD personnel filling SQEP posts within MOD nuclear programmes, by year for the past 5 calendar years

The number of non-MOD personnel filling SQEP posts within MOD Nuclear programmes who are non-SQEP, by year for the past 5 calendar years

The number of MOD personnel filling SQEP posts within MOD Nuclear programmes who are non-SQEP, by year for the past 5 calendar years 

Number of SQEP posts within MOD Nuclear programmes where concessions have been granted to allow non-SQEP personnel to occupy the post, by year for the past 5 calendar years

Two months after the request  the  MOD is unable to provide the information requested and has yet again provided a holding reply saying they may respond by 21 of January. The law requires the MOD to provide the information requested or an explanation as to why it cannot be provided within 20 working days of the request.

It's surprising that MOD cannot provide the information about SQEP  posts as the lack of SQEP personnel are a key risk to the safety of nuclear programmes, highlighted for years by the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator in their annual reports.

It also appears that the MOD  do not know how many concessions have been granted to allow non SQEP  personnel to occupy SQEP posts.   It is clear from a letter written by John Day the MOD's  2nd PUS to the union Prospect, that contractors have been used to fill some SQEP posts  and in at least one instance a contractor has been  removed from a SQEP post because they were not qualified and/or competent  to occupy the post.  It's of interest that the MOD was asked for the letter on  28th of August 2012 but only provided  the letter 5th of December 2012 yet again well in excess of the 20 working days required by the FOI Act.

" the first person supplied by the contractor was sub-standard"

"The root cause of this initial under performance was, at least in part due to an inadequate statement of requirement being provided by the MOD initially and the Submarine OC accepts the need to improve how it specifies and manages the performance of contractors"

This letter demonstrates that MOD has insufficient experienced staff to act as an intelligent customer for contractor services  used to safely deliver its nuclear programmes
.
This may in part explain the reluctance of the MOD to provide information about  the number of unqualified staff occupying SQEP posts with defence nuclear programmes.

In view of the recent articles in the Guardian News paper its interesting to consider to what extent has the inability of MOD to find properly qualified and experienced  people  contributed to the problems with the Astute nuclear submarine reported  by the Guardian. It is also interesting to consider what action the Health and Safety Executive might take under the Health and Safety at Work Act against the MOD for failing to provide a safe system of work.

It is now clear that the MOD does not know how many unqualified  people occupy SQEP posts which are key to the safe the safe delivery of MOD's nuclear programmes.

References

Earlier post - SQEP

DNESB Reports

Submarine safety letters in the Guardian Newspaper

On 16 November in response to the recent reports in the Guardian newspaper  Rear Admiral SR Lister wrote a letter to the Guardian


"Astute sea trials will rectify problems

As the Royal Navy officer responsible for the delivery of the Astute submarine programme, I must respond to your claims about the performance and potential safety of HMS Astute (Report, 16 November). All those involved in the delivery of our submarines have a duty to the submariners that serve on them to ensure that we provide a safe environment in which to live and work. As a submariner myself, I am acutely aware of the need to meet the exacting safety standards we demand and we are committed to meeting them both for HMS Astute and for the remaining submarines in the class.

I would never allow an unsafe platform to proceed to sea and the purpose of the extensive sea trials HMS Astute is undertaking is to test the submarine in a progressive manner, proving that the design is safe, that it has been manufactured correctly and that she is able to operate safely and effectively. This process reflects the nature of HMS Astute as both a prototype and an operational vessel. We have always known that it would be necessary to identify and rectify problems during sea trials and this is what we have done. All the issues noted in the story have either already been addressed or are being addressed. In particular, while we do not comment on nuclear propulsion issues, or the speed of our submarines, I can assure you that, once HMS Astute deploys operationally, we do not expect there to be any constraints on her ability to carry out her full combat role for the Royal Navy.

I invite the Guardian to spend time on HMS Astute with me to see at first hand the professionalism of the crew, the confidence they have in their boat and the rigour with which sea trials are carried out and problems addressed.

Rear admiral SR Lister
Director submarines, Ministry of Defence"

I was concerned that whilst the letter suggested that the problems reported were those normally expected to be encountered in a newly commissioned class of boat. I thought it was worth highlighting the shortcomings  in the resources and expertise needed to ensure the delivery of  the nuclear safety of the UK nuclear submarine fleet and the need for the independent regulation of nuclear safety. 

Letter of reply to Rear admiral SR Lister published in the Guardian 19 November

" Submarine safety

I read with interest the letter from Rear Admiral SR Lister, director submarines, Ministry of Defence, on the problems with the Astute submarine reported in this paper (17 November). As a former head of radiation protection policy at the MoD, I must say that public confidence would be greatly enhanced if the regulation of nuclear safety for the submarine fleet was transferred from the MoD's internal nuclear safety regulator to the Office for Nuclear Regulation, part of the Health and Safety Executive. It is also worth pointing out that the 2010-11 annual report of the Defence Nuclear and Environment Safety Board clearly shows how the MoD has failed to allocate sufficient resources to nuclear safety, in particular the lack of progress on recruiting and retaining experienced and qualified staff. The report clearly shows that ministers continue to ignore the MoD's internal nuclear regulator in the allocation of resources to support the safety of the naval nuclear propulsion programme.

Fred Dawson  Director, Milcon Research"


Reference

MOD  DNESB annual reports

Loss of specialist capabilities needed to support the nuclear propulsion programme

Guardian reports  - HMS Astute: quality control the key to restoring hunter-killer sub's reputation.  Union fears MoD has lost too many specialists amid acute sensitivity over £10bn programme

"This is what has alarmed union leaders, such as Prospect's Steve Jary, who fears the MoD has lost so many civilian specialists that it no longer has the ability to keep a proper eye on QA issues"

"The MoD is no longer able to supervise the construction of submarines effectively."

Regularly readers of this blog will recall a recent post about the loss of specialist capabilities needed to support the nuclear propulsion programme. The MOD was asked through a FOI request to provide information about loss of specialist capabilities needed to support the nuclear propulsion programme and to explore what the Union Prospect was doing to resolve the issue.

So far the MOD have failed to provide the information requested
Update on FOI request 23 November

What is becoming clear is the MOD may now reliant on contractors and granting  concessions so that less skilled and experienced personnel can be placed in SQEP posts within the MOD's nuclear progarmmes.  It is likely that this situation contributed at least in part to the problems reported in the Guardian Newspaper.

The 2010-11 DNESB and earlier reports clearly demonstrate how the MOD has failed to allocated sufficient resources to nuclear safety in particular the lack of progress on recruiting and retaining suitably experienced and qualified staff.

The 2010-11 DNESB  report clearly  shows that MOD Ministers continue to ignore MODs internal nuclear Regulator and demonstrates the need for full civil regulation by the Office for Nuclear Regulation

Other posts on this blog about  previous DNESB reports have highlighted lack of staff and resources as a significant risk to the safety of MOD's nuclear programmes. If the Guardian newspaper reports are correct the consequences of this are now all too  clear .

There's something wrong with our submarines

The Guardian newspaper reports serious concerns about the safety of the newly commissioned Astute class nuclear submarines. Including

• Flooding during a routine dive that led to Astute performing an emergency surfacing.
• Corrosion even though the boat is essentially new.
• Concern over the instruments monitoring the nuclear reactor because the wrong type of lead was used.

As Earl Beatty said at the Battle of Jutland in the First World War  "There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"

Links to the Guardian Reports

• Slow, leaky, rusty: Britain's £10bn submarine beset by design flaws,  Royal Navy's HMS Astute 'has a V8 engine with a Morris Minor gearbox'
• Britain's nuclear hunter-killer submarines were doomed from the start, The flawed thinking and design behind the fleet at the heart of Britain's navy is now coming to the fore.

If these reports are in any way correct, its seems the MOD's internal Nuclear Safety Regulator has been asleep at the wheel, making an overwhelming  case for external regulation by the Office of Nuclear Regulation.  It would not be surprising if budget cuts and cost savings also  played a significant part in this very sorry situation. The question is, to what extent these defects put the submarine, its crew and the public at risk.

It interesting to see that the problems reported by the Guardian do not seem to feature in the annual report of the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator for 2011

Radiation Protection Technical Advisory Committee (RAPTAC)

In response to a FOI request the MOD has released some of the minutes of the Radiation Protection Technical Advisory Committee (RAPTAC). 

This is the main Committee concerned with ionising radiation protection. The papers provide an insight in the issues of concern to MOD Officials in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 

 It is notable that the MOD have only provided 3 sets of minutes not the 10 requested.. 

 Issues of note include : 

• Nuclear test veterans 
• Retention and recruitment of Health Physicists 
•  Radiation dose limits 
• Application of the proposed Ionising Radiation Regulations to the MOD 

 Minutes 

1983 2nd meeting 
1980 1st meeting 
1979 2nd meeting 
Covering letterFOI and response 

FOI and response

Thank you for your email of 14 September 2012 requesting the following information: Could you please provide me with the following information:- 

1: Terms of reference of the Radiation Protection Advisory Committee (RAPTAC) referred to in the 12th report of the House of Commons Defence Committee Radiological Protection of Service and Civilian Personnel 
 2: date of the first meeting of RAPTAC 
 3: Agendas of the first 10 meetings 
 4: Minutes of the first 10 meetings 

We are treating your correspondence as a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. We have now completed an extensive search of archives for the information you requested and we have located the following documents.

RAPTAC 2nd Meeting 1979 – Minutes 
RAPTAC 1st Meeting 1980 – Minutes 
RAPTAC 2nd Meeting 1983 – Agenda
RAPTAC 2nd Meeting 1983 – Minutes 
RAPTAC 1st Meeting 1984 – Agenda 
RAPTAC 2nd Meeting 1984 - Agenda 

We have provided all the information that we could locate for you. These documents have been assessed under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and personal information has been redacted under the Absolute Exemption Section 40.

Loss of specialist capabilities needed to support the nuclear propulsion programme

The MOD was asked through a FOI request to provide information about loss of specialist capabilities needed to support the nuclear propulsion programme and to explore what the Union Prospect was doing to resolve the issue.


FOI Request 28 August 2012

"Request for Information under the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act 2000 

Thank you for your email of 28 August 2012 requesting the following information: 

Letters and emails between MOD Officials and the Union Prospect concerning the loss of specialist capabilities needed to support the nuclear propulsion programme and the Frame work Agreement Technical Services for the period January 2012 to June 2012. 

I am writing to advise you that we are still working to identify the information that falls within the scope of your request.  I estimate that it will take a further 20 working days to identify this information, so I will write to you again no later than 23 October 2012.  Please accept my apologies for the delay, and for not providing a response within the 20 working days set out in the FOI Act."  

• The delay in providing the information requested again points out the failure of the MOD to meet its legal duty to provide the information requested within 20 working days.
• It may also indicate that the MOD's  document and record keeping systems, even for recent correspondence are seriously flawed.
• It may be the case that the MOD does not want to release the information and wishes to hide the information for fear that it will inevitably show that the MOD is still failing to provide the required level of specialist resource to safely deliver its nuclear programmes.
• The MOD may now have become reliant on contractors and granting  concessions so that less skilled and experienced personnel can be placed in SQEP posts within the MOD's nuclear progarmmes.  

MOD Radiation Protection and Radioactive Waste Committee Papers

In response to a FOI request the MOD have released  the minutes of a number of committees concerned with radiation protection and the management of radioactive waste.

Link to FOI requesting :-

"a; the minutes,
b: agendas
c: Terms of reference

for

a: the Radiation Protection Policy Committee (RPPC)
b: the Radioactive Waste Working Group (RWWG)
c: the Radioactive Waste Information Group (RAWIG),

for the period 1990 to 2000"

The MOD provided the following information

Radioactive Waste Working Group RWWG

Terms of Reference

Minutes

7  January 1999
20 May 1999
9 September 1999
13 January 2000
7 June 20000
19 September 2000

Radiation Protection Policy Committee RPPC

Terms of Reference

a:                    b:

Minutes

17 October 1996
28 January 1998
9 June 1998

Radioactive Waste Information Group RAWIG

Terms of Reference -  not provided

Minutes

13 January 1999
18 May 2000
8 November 2000

Its notable that apart from the agendas these are the only documents provided,  the MOD said that

 " Despite an extensive search of the archives we have been unable to locate a complete set of minutes, agendas and terms of reference for the committees detailed in your request. Some of the files which may have contained the minutes, agendas and terms of reference for the committees have been destroyed."   

 It seems very surprising that the minutes of MOD central committees dealing with issues as significant as radiation safety and the management of radioactive waste and radioactively contaminated land  have been lost or destroyed. 

These remaining documents  provide a snap-shot  of the radiation protection and radioactive waste issues faced by the MOD and show how the MOD was responding. The documents  also provide a good indication of the value of the papers that have been lost.

The more cynical  may be suspect, within the MOD there is a deliberate policy of destroying  files to avoid  answering difficult questions about past activities and dodging liability.  Such a policy appears to have resulted  in  a "corporate lobotomy"  so far as knowledge of  historic activities are concerned. It also results in an inability to learn from history that would help inform decisions concerning current activities and issues.

A previous post  also drew attention the loss of files and records

Failure to ensure the preservation of the minutes of the  central MOD Committee concerned with Radioactive Waste Management for the  period 1975 to 1985.

DE&S Contractorisation a disaster in the making

DE&S provides the intelligent customer function for Defence procurement  including expertise in examining  and drawing up contracts to ensure that they offer value for money whilst delivering the required defence capability.  The proposal to contractorise DE&S  will remove this intelligent customer function and risks causing a similar but far larger problem than occurred in the education sector where budgets were devolved  to schools which lacked the necessary expertise  in understanding, drawing up and managing contracts.

The result for schools is a laptop that has a price of between £350 and £400 the school was charged £3,750. Another example is a school that had to pay nearly £500,000 to settle a lease on behalf of one school for photocopiers worth just £45,000.   It is interesting to consider what the situation will be for the taxpayer with much larger contracts in the defence sector. 

It is suspected that because of contractorisation safety and environmental aspects of procurement will either be exploited by companies to increase the cost to taxpayer of defence systems or given a  low priority.

Transparency and openness  of defence procurement will be significantly reduced as the Freedom of Information Act does not apply to commercial undertakings as will accountability to Parliament.

Planned Privatisation of the Military Equipment Agency

The Guardian recently reported

"Ministry of Defence plans to privatise the multibillion-pound agency that provides the armed forces with military equipment appear ill thought out, could endanger British troops and are potentially undemocratic, according to a report by a leading security thinktank"


Royal United Services Institute have issued a briefing paper " The Defence Materiel Strategy and the GOCO Proposal for Abbey Wood". "We also wonder if ministers are being asked to take a decision whose major implications are poorly understood. Ignorance is no substitute for forethought and objectivity: the government and the country cannot afford a wrong decision in this area. In the meantime, we wonder if those tasked with making this solution work might use the questions above as an aid to a fuller examination. This might help them to avoid the unintended, and potentially huge, negative consequences that always emerge from complex and challenging undertakings, especially where the pros and cons have not been thoroughly examined."


Some points to consider

Governance, accountability and transparency required in a democratic nation’s public business

Its open to question whether or not the FOI/EIR would apply to the GOCO. If it turns out that the FOI/EIR do not apply to the GOCO there will be a very significant reduction in openness and transparency; as stakeholders (citizens, journalists NGOs) will no longer have legal power to obtain information about the safety issues and environmental harm caused by the countries military nuclear programmes.

MOD as an intelligent customer

Since previous contractorisations of the Dockyards and AWE, D&ES have been the MOD intelligent customer for the services of the contractors running these sites.  If DE&S themselves become a contractor it appears there will be no expertise left within the MOD to act as a intelligent customer for its contractors services or to make judgements on contractor performance against contractual obligations.

Civil Regulation 

If DE&S is contractorised the Naval Bases which support the nuclear programme should be subject to civil regulation and licensed under the Nuclear Installations Act by the Office of Nuclear Regulation , DNSRs MOD internal regulators role being limited to submarines at sea. From a safety point of view this is to welcomed 

I  have recently been informed by reliable sources, " that this  won't happen. The Naval Bases are to be transferred back to Naval Command and the NBC's will be the Authorisees, where appropriate. Similarly the Intelligent Customer function will be Naval Command's".

DE&S

This organisational chart gives an indication of the scope of work carried out by DE&S that may well be contractorised. It's also  interesting to note this publicly available chart gives names, post titles, email and phone numbers including Submarines, headed by Director Submarines - RAdm Simon Lister Mil: 9352 37504, Tel: 0117 91 37504 email: DESSM-DirMA@mod.uk

Serious resource issues effecting the nuclear submarine programme

A recent report in the Telegraph highlighted serious resource issues effecting the nuclear submarine programme.  These resourcing issues have been highlighted in the Milcon Blog  for a number of years.

The Telegraph reports the MOD responding to its article by saying that the MOD

" recognises that the Royal Navy has sufficient manpower for its submarines and we are confident that this will remain the case."

This seems to be at odds with what the DNSR, MOD's internal Nuclear Safety Regulatory has highlighted resourcing as a red risk  in the DNSR's  Annual report for  2011 which states

 "These are that inadequacy of resources, both money and staff complement, and the difficulties in maintaining a sustainable cadre of suitably competent staff (Royal Navy, MOD civilians  and in industry partners) are the principal threats to safety in the DNP in the medium term"


This seems to suggest that the response from the MOD Press Office bears little relation the  situation expressed by the MOD's  own internal Regulator.  

Defence Nuclear Environment Safety Board Annual Report 2010-11

In response to a FOI request the MOD published the Annual DNESB report for 2010-11.  The report yet again highlights the lack of adequate staff and resources to safely deliver the MODs nuclear capability.


The 2010 DNESB and earlier reports clearly demonstrate how the MOD has failed to allocated sufficient resources to nuclear safety in particular the lack of progress on recruiting and retaining suitably experienced and qualified staff.

The 2010 DNESB  report clearly  shows that MOD Ministers continue to ignore MODs internal nuclear Regulator and demonstrates the need for full civil regulation by the Office for Nuclear Regulation

Posts on this blog about  previous DNESB reports have highlighted lack of staff and resources as a significant risk to the safety of MOD's nuclear programmes.


Link to DNESB reports


Link to press report in the Guardian 


Link to a report by Rob Edwards

MOD provides no evidence that MOD follows best practice for the management of contaminated land

This FOI was submitted to the MOD following concerns raised about poor record keeping by the MOD relating to contaminated land and the MOD saying that it had in place a “robust, proactive programme mirrors industry best practice, ensures the land is suitable for use and will not cause harm to people or the environment”


“I note from a recent BBC news report into radioactive contamination concerns at RAF Kinloss MOD is quoted as saying "The MoD is committed to assessing land quality across the entire defence estate. This robust, proactive programme mirrors industry best practice, ensures the land is suitable for use and will not cause harm to people or the environment.”

"I note that MOD is a member of “Safegrounds” which has produced best practice guidance for the management of radioactive contaminated land.

Could you please provide me with the audit and compliance reports that demonstrate that the MOD meets this “ industry best practice”

Also you could please provide me with me with the audit and compliance reports that demonstrate that the MOD meets “SAFEGROUNDS Good practice guidance for land quality records management for nuclear-licensed and defence sites””

The MOD replied

“I can confirm that the MOD holds no information that falls within the scope of your request. I am advised that there are no requirements for the MOD to have audit and compliance reports in relation to the management of radioactive contaminated land.”  

“There is no requirement for the MOD to follow the Safegrounds guidance for land quality records management, therefore no audit and compliance reports exist”

Full reply.

The reply clearly shows that the MOD can provide no evidence to support it's statement saying that the MOD meets “best practice” and this by implication means there are no audit or compliance systems to demonstrate that it is meeting its own policy and standards for managing radioactive contaminated land let alone discharge its legal duty of care to protect man and the environment.

It is also interesting to note the MOD in JSP375 Volume 4 the MOD Safety Health and Environment Audit manual lays down the requirement for audits to provide assurance that health safety and environmental standards are being met. The reply to the FOI suggests that this requirement in so far as the management of contaminated land and “best practice” is concerned that the MOD is ignoring its own requirements for audit and assurance.

Refrences

Safegrounds Good Practice  Guidance  for the Management of Contaminated land on Nuclear-licensed and Defence Sites; version 2

Safegounds Good Practcie Guidance for Land Quality Records Management for Nuclear-licensed and Defence Sites

Staff cuts cause breach of statutory duty

I recently requested the Defence Nuclear and Environmental Safety Board (DNESB) annual reports for 2011 and 2010


MOD Response


“In the case of your request for the DNESB 2011 report (we have interpreted this as a
request for the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator Annual Report 2011), as there is
information contained within the report which may need to be withheld from the document
for its release under FOIA, a public interest test is required.


Unfortunately the Public Interest Test is taking longer to carry out than anticipated at the
time; this is in part due subject matter expert unavailability. I am therefore unable to
provide you with a substantive response to the second part of your request at this time.
I will write to you again by Wednesday 4 July, by which time I expect to be able provide
you with a final response to your request for information. ”


This response provides a damming example of how resource cuts are causing the MOD to breach its statutory duties in relation to the Freedom of Information Act to provide the information requested with 20 working days.


I suspect that the “subject matter expert” referred to in the response are specialist staff who because of their years of experience and qualifications cost more to employ than non-specialist staff. Consequently specialist staff have been offered early retirement, enabling the MOD to meet cost and staff reduction targets.


The loss of such staff reflects a dumbing down of MODs’ technical expertise, the loss of the ability to act as an “intelligent customer” for its contractors services and the ability to be properly accountable to Parliament, the public for complex technical issues such as nuclear safety.

MOD policy on contaminated land and alienated sites

In response to a FOI request about how MOD responded to the recommendations contained in the 2000 report by RWMAC    “RWMAC's Advice to Ministers on The Ministry of Defence's Arrangements for Dealing with Radioactively Contaminated Land“. It is clear from the response to action 12 that the MOD has no intention of identifying  what contamination exists on land that it has disposed of prior to the LQA programme such as Dalgety Bay.  


It is also clear from the response to action 12 of the RWMAC report that MOD believes this responsibility lies with Local Authorities.  Local Authorities hold few if any records that would assist them in identifying contamination on former MOD sites let alone the financial resources to support such activity.  


I believe it is important for the safety of the environment and the public, that risks from defence related pollutants are identified and if necessary remediated.  Examples of such pollutants are :-

• radioactive substances such as  radium, 
• chemical weapon residues such as mustard gas, 
• asbestos, 
• organic solvents, 
• explosives and ammunition
• toxic heavy metals such as mercury, lead and cadmium 

I also believe that it is the MODs’  responsibility to  identify where there is a legacy of pollution from defence activities  and where identified as the polluter, MOD should pay to for any clean up rather that  pushing off the responsibility onto poorly resourced local authorities  and council tax payers and Regulators 


RWMAC ACTION PLAN page 3 


Action 12
“MOD should give thought to the feasibility of compiling information on disposals of land predating the LQA programme, where radioactive contamination might have been involved.”


MOD response 


“The introduction of EPA 1990 Part 2A places the responsibility for inspecting land with the local authority to identify land contamination.”