The MOD needs to accept liability for the contamination at Dalgety Bay so that the contamination can properly identified, managed and dealt with; claims by those who suffered blight etc can be addressed. The MOD needs to implement the principles of environmental justice in its policies and decision making.
MODs reluctance to accept liability may be influenced by the precedent that might be set for the hundreds of other contaminated sites the MOD sold off since WW2, such as RAF Pulham in Norfolk
Dunfermline Press reports :-
GORDON BROWN has asked the head of the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) to make an early decision on who is responsible for the radiation leaks at Dalgety Bay. He said this was now essential if the remedial action plan to clean up the Bay area was to go ahead and be funded. It was time, he said, to name who was guilty for the leaks so further delays in cleaning up could be avoided.
He has written to SEPA after a letter to Dalgety Bay Community Council from the Ministry of Defence. In it the Ministry says it cannot agree to fund the clean-up until SEPA makes a decision as to who is responsible for the damage at the Bay's foreshore.
In his letter Mr Brown says the delays have to be brought to an end and he wants clean-up work to begin next May. Mr Brown, who has already met the Defence Secretary and held a Parliamentary debate on the issues, told SEPA, "It is clear that we will not make progress on the remediation plan until a decision is made about responsibility for the contamination and in that context I am writing to ask when you will make a determination on this issue.
"As we understand it there has yet to be conclusive evidence suggesting that other parties than the Ministry of Defence may be responsible for the dumping of radiation materials. "The MOD say they will only fund the clean-up if they are held to be liable by you and I hope you can
tell me when we can come to a conclusion on this matter.
"The people of Dalgety Bay have been very patient. We cannot continue with the prevarication and passing of the buck on who is responsible.
"A decision should be made as quickly as possible to protect the May 2013 timetable for the start of the clean-up."
My personal view has always been; that the evidence proves that the MOD was the probable source of the radium contamination and that by denying liability MOD has and continues to waste large amounts taxpayers payers money over the period of 20 or more years since the contamination was discovered.
It is also very convenient that the papers relating to the sale of Dalgety Bay which may have provided key evidence about liability cannot be found.
"Dalgety Bay the MOD is unable to locate records about the sale of radioactively contaminated land and the local Community Council appeals to the public for their help."
Its notable that the MOD is looking find a sites to break apart the decommissioned nuclear
submarines including Roysth a few miles west of Dalgety Bay
NIS report
"MoD has published a Request for Information in the Defence Contracts Bulletin and the Official Journal of the European Union seeking responses from private owners of nuclear licensed sites in the UK that may, subject to a comprehensive and publicly transparent site selection process, be able to meet its intermediate level waste storage requirements.
Babcock Marine, owners of the Rosyth and Devonport dockyards which are being considered as candidate sites for dismantling of the redundant submarines"
In view of the way in which the MOD has handled the contamination of the beach and foreshore at Dalgety Bay, it will be interesting to see to what extent there is public and political support in
Scotland for the dismantling work to take place at Rosyth.
From an ethical point of view the choice of Rosyth could be seen the MOD taking advantage of an economically disadvantaged community by holding out the chance of some short term work in exchange for taking on the legacy of the nuclear submarine programme. Dalgety Bay provides an example of the consequences of a legacy left by past defence activities.
The Guardian recently revealed problems with the Astute nuclear submarine, which is coming to the end of three years of sea trials.
In the subsequent article in the Guardian Rear Admiral Lister is quoted as saying
"it would be wrong for the military to claim the difficulties were just "stuff and nonsense and teething troubles",but he also said it would also be wrong for critics to write off what is the navy's most technically advanced boat."
I think the truth lies between these two positions
Rear Admiral Lister is also quoted as saying that "he had identified three sorts of problems with the Astute:
- flaws in design that only became apparent when testing started;
- equipment that broke down too easily;
- and some problems relating to poor construction at the shipyard.""
What the Guardian article does not explain are the root causes that lead to these problems. It would be most interesting to know to what extent continuous organisational change together with budget cuts within the MOD played a part; on this both the Guardian and the MOD are silent.
On the 23rd of October MOD was requested to provide information about suitably qualified and experienced (SQEP) personnel who provide key support to safe delivery MOD nuclear Programmes.
The number of non-MOD personnel filling SQEP posts within MOD nuclear programmes, by year for the past 5 calendar years
The number of non-MOD personnel filling SQEP posts within MOD Nuclear programmes who are non-SQEP, by year for the past 5 calendar years
The number of MOD personnel filling SQEP posts within MOD Nuclear programmes who are non-SQEP, by year for the past 5 calendar years
Number of SQEP posts within MOD Nuclear programmes where concessions have been granted to allow non-SQEP personnel to occupy the post, by year for the past 5 calendar years
Two months after the request the MOD is unable to provide the information requested and has yet again provided a holding reply saying they may respond by 21 of January. The law requires the MOD to provide the information requested or an explanation as to why it cannot be provided within 20 working days of the request.
It's surprising that MOD cannot provide the information about SQEP posts as the lack of SQEP personnel are a key risk to the safety of nuclear programmes, highlighted for years by the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator in their annual reports.
It also appears that the MOD do not know how many concessions have been granted to allow non SQEP personnel to occupy SQEP posts. It is clear from a letter written by John Day the MOD's 2nd PUS to the union Prospect, that contractors have been used to fill some SQEP posts and in at least one instance a contractor has been removed from a SQEP post because they were not qualified and/or competent to occupy the post. It's of interest that the MOD was asked for the letter on 28th of August 2012 but only provided the letter 5th of December 2012 yet again well in excess of the 20 working days required by the FOI Act.
" the first person supplied by the contractor was sub-standard"
"The root cause of this initial under performance was, at least in part due to an inadequate statement of requirement being provided by the MOD initially and the Submarine OC accepts the need to improve how it specifies and manages the performance of contractors"
This letter demonstrates that MOD has insufficient experienced staff to act as an intelligent customer for contractor services used to safely deliver its nuclear programmes
.
This may in part explain the reluctance of the MOD to provide information about the number of unqualified staff occupying SQEP posts with defence nuclear programmes.
In view of the recent articles in the Guardian News paper its interesting to consider to what extent has the inability of MOD to find properly qualified and experienced people contributed to the problems with the Astute nuclear submarine reported by the Guardian. It is also interesting to consider what action the Health and Safety Executive might take under the Health and Safety at Work Act against the MOD for failing to provide a safe system of work.
It is now clear that the MOD does not know how many unqualified people occupy SQEP posts which are key to the safe the safe delivery of MOD's nuclear programmes.
References
Earlier post - SQEP
DNESB Reports
On 16 November in response to the recent reports in the Guardian newspaper Rear Admiral SR Lister wrote a letter to the Guardian
"Astute sea trials will rectify problems
As the Royal Navy officer responsible for the delivery of the Astute submarine programme, I must respond to your claims about the performance and potential safety of HMS Astute (Report, 16 November). All those involved in the delivery of our submarines have a duty to the submariners that serve on them to ensure that we provide a safe environment in which to live and work. As a submariner myself, I am acutely aware of the need to meet the exacting safety standards we demand and we are committed to meeting them both for HMS Astute and for the remaining submarines in the class.
I would never allow an unsafe platform to proceed to sea and the purpose of the extensive sea trials HMS Astute is undertaking is to test the submarine in a progressive manner, proving that the design is safe, that it has been manufactured correctly and that she is able to operate safely and effectively. This process reflects the nature of HMS Astute as both a prototype and an operational vessel. We have always known that it would be necessary to identify and rectify problems during sea trials and this is what we have done. All the issues noted in the story have either already been addressed or are being addressed. In particular, while we do not comment on nuclear propulsion issues, or the speed of our submarines, I can assure you that, once HMS Astute deploys operationally, we do not expect there to be any constraints on her ability to carry out her full combat role for the Royal Navy.
I invite the Guardian to spend time on HMS Astute with me to see at first hand the professionalism of the crew, the confidence they have in their boat and the rigour with which sea trials are carried out and problems addressed.
Rear admiral SR Lister
Director submarines, Ministry of Defence"
I was concerned that whilst the letter suggested that the problems reported were those normally expected to be encountered in a newly commissioned class of boat. I thought it was worth highlighting the shortcomings in the resources and expertise needed to ensure the delivery of the nuclear safety of the UK nuclear submarine fleet and the need for the independent regulation of nuclear safety.
Letter of reply to Rear admiral SR Lister published in the Guardian 19 November
" Submarine safety
I read with interest the letter from Rear Admiral SR Lister, director submarines, Ministry of Defence, on the problems with the Astute submarine reported in this paper (17 November). As a former head of radiation protection policy at the MoD, I must say that public confidence would be greatly enhanced if the regulation of nuclear safety for the submarine fleet was transferred from the MoD's internal nuclear safety regulator to the Office for Nuclear Regulation, part of the Health and Safety Executive. It is also worth pointing out that the 2010-11 annual report of the Defence Nuclear and Environment Safety Board clearly shows how the MoD has failed to allocate sufficient resources to nuclear safety, in particular the lack of progress on recruiting and retaining experienced and qualified staff. The report clearly shows that ministers continue to ignore the MoD's internal nuclear regulator in the allocation of resources to support the safety of the naval nuclear propulsion programme.
Fred Dawson Director, Milcon Research"
Reference
MOD DNESB annual reports
