Dalgety Bay the saga drags on and on......

The MOD needs to accept liability for the contamination at Dalgety Bay so that the contamination can properly identified, managed and dealt with; claims by those who suffered blight etc can be addressed. The MOD needs to implement the principles of environmental justice in its policies and decision making.

MODs reluctance to accept liability may be influenced by the precedent that might be set for the hundreds of other contaminated sites the MOD sold off since WW2, such as RAF Pulham in Norfolk

Dunfermline Press reports :- 

GORDON BROWN has asked the head of the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) to  make an early decision on who is responsible for the radiation leaks at Dalgety Bay. He said this was now essential if the remedial action plan to clean up the Bay area was to go ahead and be funded. It was time, he said, to name who was guilty for the leaks so further delays in cleaning up could be avoided.

He has written to SEPA after a letter to Dalgety Bay Community Council from the Ministry of  Defence. In it the Ministry says it cannot agree to fund the clean-up until SEPA makes a decision as to who is responsible for the damage at the Bay's foreshore.

In his letter Mr Brown says the delays have to be brought to an end and he wants clean-up work to begin next May. Mr Brown, who has already met the Defence Secretary and held a Parliamentary debate on the issues, told SEPA, "It is clear that we will not make progress on the remediation plan until a decision is made about responsibility for the contamination and in that context I am writing to ask when you will make a determination on this issue.

"As we understand it there has yet to be conclusive evidence suggesting that other parties than the Ministry of Defence may be responsible for the dumping of radiation materials. "The MOD say they will only fund the clean-up if they are held to be liable by you and I hope you can 
tell me when we can come to a conclusion on this matter.

"The people of Dalgety Bay have been very patient. We cannot continue with the prevarication and passing of the buck on who is responsible.

"A decision should be made as quickly as possible to protect the May 2013 timetable for the start of the clean-up."

My personal view has always been; that the evidence proves that the MOD was the probable source of the radium contamination and that by denying liability MOD has and continues to waste large amounts taxpayers payers money over the period of 20 or more years since the contamination was discovered.  

It is also very convenient that the papers relating to the sale of Dalgety Bay which may have provided key evidence about liability cannot be found. 

"Dalgety Bay the MOD is unable to locate records about the sale of radioactively contaminated land  and the local Community Council appeals to the public for their help."

Its notable that the MOD is looking find a sites to break apart the decommissioned nuclear 
submarines including Roysth a few miles west of Dalgety Bay

NIS report

"MoD has published a Request for Information in the Defence Contracts Bulletin and the Official Journal of the European Union seeking responses from private owners of nuclear licensed sites in the UK that may, subject to a comprehensive and publicly transparent site selection process, be able to meet its intermediate level waste storage requirements.

Babcock Marine, owners of the Rosyth and Devonport dockyards which are being considered as candidate sites for dismantling of the redundant submarines"

In view of the way in which the MOD has handled the contamination of the beach and foreshore at Dalgety Bay, it  will be interesting to see to what extent there is public and political support in 
Scotland for the dismantling work to take place at Rosyth.

From an ethical point of view  the choice of Rosyth could be seen the MOD taking advantage of an economically disadvantaged community by holding out the chance of some short term work in exchange for taking on the legacy of the nuclear submarine programme.  Dalgety Bay provides an example of the consequences of a  legacy left by past defence activities.

MOD - Nuclear Liabilities Management Strategy

In 2007 the MOD published its policy on the management of radioactive waste arising from the defence nuclear programmes.

• Policy
• Annex to the policy paper
• Flyer

Four years later In 2011 the MOD published “Nuclear Liabilities Management Strategy “  the strategy was meant to explain how the policy outcomes set out in the policy paper were to be delivered, who was responsible for their delivery,  when these would be delivered,  and to identify costs and how/when the costs would be met.


However the strategy is very much a narrative document describing sources of wastes and options for management.  It is notable that the Strategy is very much focused on the submarine programme.   


There is no mention of decommissioning Aldermaston; the strategy states “End Point AWE will continue to support the DNP for the foreseeable future.”  The MOD is blind to the need to anticipate change and in any case at some point in the future buildings and facilities at AWE will need to be decommissioned and replaced as they age.


The MOD policy required that the strategy would be produced in consultation with stakeholders including NGOs. As far as can be determined no NGOs were consulted. This is in contrast to the national strategy produced by the NDA where the NDA actively engaged with external stakeholders including local communities and NGOs.


The strategy says “The MOD will consider public engagement on a case by case basis taking account of Government policy and environmental and planning law” The policy says 
“the MOD remains confident that in conjunction with stakeholders (OGDs and NGOs), it is able to deliver the policy set out above” 


The expectation was that MOD in developing the strategy will meet the requirement of its stated policy to involve NGOs. However it is now clear from the strategy MOD will only do the minimum required by law 


“6.3 Funding
P134 Expenditure on managing the MOD’s
nuclear liabilities will be appropriately prioritised
within the Defence budget. Funding for strategy
development and implementation is not reliant
on income from the realisation of assets’ values.”


The strategy fails in that it provides no indication of costs or how funding is to be provided against the ongoing programme of resource cuts and savings targets 

In 2007 Hansard reported  decommisioning liabilities of over £ 9 billion

19 Jan 2007 : Column 1365W—continued

"Nuclear Liabilities

Chris Huhne: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether his Department’s nuclear liabilities have been quantified; and how they are funded. [116180]

Des Browne: The Department’s nuclear liabilities are set out in the Department’s Annual Report and Accounts, the most recent version being those for 2005-06 (HC1394) published on 14 July 2006; a copy of which is available in the Library of the House. The estimate of the MOD’s nuclear liabilities (page 220) is £9,753,827,000"

The lack of any costs in the strategy suggest that MOD might be trying to hide an increase in decommmsssioning costs





“6.2 People, Skills and Capability
P133 Available Suitably Qualified and
Experienced Personnel (SQEP) are essential to
the MOD and its industrial partners and supply
chain to deliver successful liability management,
and decommissioning and disposal projects. The
MOD’s SQEP initiatives support the development
and implementation of this Strategy.”


The DNEB have for years pointed out that levels of SQEP staffing are below that required for the safe delivery of the nuclear programme. The ever increasing need to cut costs and the priority being given to delivery of operational capability rather than backend decommissioning  suggest this is a significant area of weakness in the delivery the policy outcomes for managing nuclear liabilities


“6.5 Information and Knowledge
Management


P136 The MOD recognises the long programme
timescales associated with implementation of
this strategy; the MOD’s system of information
and knowledge management is essential for
the effective retention of information and for
maintaining continuity between projects.”


Recent revelations have shown MODs unable to retain information and records over the medium let alone the long term.


Conclusion


The Nuclear Liabilities Management Strategy lacks substance and detail and appears to be little more than an exercise in window dressing, particularly when compared to the strategy produced for the civil sector by the NDA.


Reference:


NDA paper "Non NDA Liability Management Strategy March 2011" includes reference to the Ministry of Defence

MOD nuclear decommissioning strategy, a state secret

Following an internal review relating to a FOI request to the MOD to provide information about its nuclear decommissioning strategy; MOD continues to keep details of its nuclear decommissioning strategy secret and has reneged on its own policy to involve stakeholders including NGOs in the development of its decommissioning strategy preferring the old discredited “announce and defend” approach to decision making.

The MOD policy makes clear that the strategy is to be developed in consultation with stakeholders which means that the draft strategy should be a public document.

The following references in the MOD policy support this view

Para 8 K “consulting appropriate public and stakeholder groups on the options considered and the contents of the strategy”

Para 10 “Whilst in no way underestimating the task ahead the MOD remains confident that in conjunction with stakeholders (OGDs and NGOs) it is able to deliver the policy outcomes set out above”

Policy statement

Extract from the MOD’s internal review.

“MOD Decommissioning and Disposal Strategy (Section 35 and Section 22)

12. DE&S informed you that the information is being withheld in its entirety under section 35(1)(a) and explained that although there is a public interest in the development of the MOD's Decommissioning and Disposal Strategy, there is a greater public interest in MOD having the space to develop that strategy in an effective manner, including proposing and discussing new ideas, without the fear that there would be early disclosure of information before it has had an opportunity to mature. At the time of your request the consultation process was ongoing and I can confirm that this has not yet been finalised. lt is vital for MOD to be able to discuss all options in a free and frank manner and that disclosure would be detrimental to this process as participants would be less than free and frank if they were concerned that their contributions would later be subject to disclosure. Again, I can also inform you that this exemption is engaged where the information can be accurately characterised as relating to formulation or development of government policy.”

It notable that the information requested does not relate to policy but the strategy that delivers the policy outcomes referred to in “Ministry of Defence Policy for Decommissioning and Disposal of Radioactive Waste and Residual Nuclear Material arising from the Nuclear Programme.

The MOD approach is in stark contrast to the open and transparent processes which the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) employs; involving stakeholders including NGOs in the development of their strategy. The NDA seems to have no problems discussing new ideas, or fears about the early disclosure of information before it has had an opportunity to mature.

The report on non NDA Liability Management Strategy published in March 2010 indicates MOD’s failure to address liabilities for Exotic Fuel and Higher Active Waste

To quote from the report

“MoD currently owns the largest stock of exotic fuel which is stored at Sellafield. MoD does not have a long term liability management plan for these fuels so their impact on NDA‘s exotic strategy is as yet undetermined. There is the potential that this could form part of the exotic fuels inventory and hence may influence the NDA strategy” and

“Higher Active Waste. Wastes from BE reprocessing and potentially from MoD fuel processing will require (i) long term management, (ii) appropriate conditioning for ultimate disposal, and (iii) disposal in the GDF”.

This demonstrates that MODs inability to develop a strategy for managing its nuclear liabilities is impacting negatively on the NDA and nationally on the “managing radioactively waste safely” process.

This all tends to suggest that MODs reluctance to provide information on its strategy for managing nuclear decommissioning liabilities is to avoid embarrassment about an inability to make decisions on how to manage these liabilities, failure to afford them proper priority and most of all, a lack of funds.

What no decommissioning Strategy !!!

MODs' own reports acknowledge there is no funding to deliver the decommissioning strategy. However a properly funded decommissioning strategy is one of the key requirements for holding a nuclear site license in the civil sector, why should MOD be any different?

From the 2009 DNESB report

“Decommissioning & Disposal. 2005 issue 3 updated and reduced.
No Decommissioning and Disposal Strategy and no funded plan for decommissioning and disposal of submarine including adequate facilities to de-fuel them at the end of service life”

However the guidance from the HSE to inspectors on decommissioning nuclear licensed sites requires licensees’ to demonstrate that they have funding to carry out decommissioning and for state owned industry should describe their corresponding arrangements.

Extract from “NUCLEAR SAFETY DIRECTORATE GUIDANCE FOR INSPECTORS ON DECOMMISSIONING ON NUCLEAR LICENSED SITES

A2.3.14 Demonstration of Financial Provision

A2.3.14.1 Comprehensive estimates of the costs of decommissioning should be provided and linked to the activities to be carried out. All significant activities should be taken into account including corporate and general infrastructure responsibilities; radioactive waste management, storage and disposal; decontamination and dismantling works; care and maintenance; monitoring and surveillance and any other associated activities. Major cost components should be identified together with the distribution of costs with time. Any assumptions made on discount rates and the timescales over which they have been applied should be justified (see Appendix 6).

A2.3.14.2 Licensees should provide details of the arrangements for the funding of their nuclear liabilities. In the case of the privatised industry the financial provision is expected to be contained in segregated funds, kept separate from other company funds. The state owned industry should describe their corresponding arrangements. Licensees should provide a demonstration of the adequacy of the financial provision being made to implement the strategies. This should show that the strategy does not economically foreclose on earlier options for decommissioning, including an explanation of how the costs will change and the money will be provided if alternative options are chosen.”

Extract from a note by the Health & Safety Executive- Financial Implications of Licence Condition Compliance at NDA Sites:

“Financial Implications for Site Licensees
HSE clearly has an interest in whether the site license company (SLC) has reasonable expectation of access to sufficient resources to enable it to comply with all the Licence Conditions, and to have confidence that those resources will continue to be available at least for the term of the NDA contract. Confidence in the likely access to adequate and secure funding is one factor which HSE takes into account in its continuous assessment of whether an SLC is, and is likely to remain, a fit and proper body to hold the nuclear site licence (bearing in mind that if not happy with the SLC’s fitness, HSE has the power to revoke a licence at any time, and to impose suitable controls on the ex-licensee via Directions issued under the Nuclear Installations Act).”

The MOD is not subject regulation by the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 (NIA65) but subject to a system of internal regulation enforced by the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator (DNSR); it is clear that DNSR lacks the regulatory power to ensure that the MOD decommissioning strategy is funded as would be the case on a civil site regulated by the HSE/NII.

If the MOD controlled nuclear activities were subject to regulation under the NIA65 it is worth considering if HSE would find the MOD fit and proper body to hold a nuclear site licence.

The lack of a funded decommissioning strategy provides powerful evidence of the need to apply the Nuclear Installation Act 1965 to MOD controlled nuclear activities.