MOD policy on contaminated land and alienated sites

In response to a FOI request about how MOD responded to the recommendations contained in the 2000 report by RWMAC    “RWMAC's Advice to Ministers on The Ministry of Defence's Arrangements for Dealing with Radioactively Contaminated Land“. It is clear from the response to action 12 that the MOD has no intention of identifying  what contamination exists on land that it has disposed of prior to the LQA programme such as Dalgety Bay.  


It is also clear from the response to action 12 of the RWMAC report that MOD believes this responsibility lies with Local Authorities.  Local Authorities hold few if any records that would assist them in identifying contamination on former MOD sites let alone the financial resources to support such activity.  


I believe it is important for the safety of the environment and the public, that risks from defence related pollutants are identified and if necessary remediated.  Examples of such pollutants are :-

• radioactive substances such as  radium, 
• chemical weapon residues such as mustard gas, 
• asbestos, 
• organic solvents, 
• explosives and ammunition
• toxic heavy metals such as mercury, lead and cadmium 

I also believe that it is the MODs’  responsibility to  identify where there is a legacy of pollution from defence activities  and where identified as the polluter, MOD should pay to for any clean up rather that  pushing off the responsibility onto poorly resourced local authorities  and council tax payers and Regulators 


RWMAC ACTION PLAN page 3 


Action 12
“MOD should give thought to the feasibility of compiling information on disposals of land predating the LQA programme, where radioactive contamination might have been involved.”


MOD response 


“The introduction of EPA 1990 Part 2A places the responsibility for inspecting land with the local authority to identify land contamination.”

MOD admits that it has no clear idea of what the risk is to people from the radium contamination at Dalgety Bay

In press report in the Sunday Herald MOD is quoted as saying

"New radioactive sources have been found at Dalgety Bay and we take this very seriously. However, it is not yet clear what the level of risk is."

This statement clearly shows that despite all the surveys MOD admits that it has no clear idea of what the risk is to people from the radium contamination at Dalgety Bay

Maralinga a lasting legacy of British nuclear weapons tests in Australia

 The Sydney Morning Herald reports

“Ten years after the all-clear, Maralinga is still toxic

More than a decade after the Howard government hailed the clean-up of Maralinga as completed, the government is continuing to support remediation at the former British nuclear weapons test site.

Confidential files released under freedom-of-information laws show Canberra officials have at times been mainly concerned with ''perceptions'' of radioactive contamination while rejecting a request by the Maralinga Tjarutja Aboriginal community for a site near the Maralinga village to be cleared of high levels of contamination. Files released by the Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism show erosion of the massive Taranaki burial trench north of Maralinga, described by officials as ''a large radioactive waste repository'', has required significant remediation. Other burial pits have been subject to subsidence and erosion, exposing asbestos-contaminated debris.

While the documents indicate ''no radiological contamination of groundwater'' has been detected, the government has been obliged, under its 2009 agreement with Maralinga Tjarutja for the handback of the test site, to initiate further work.

The Taranaki trench was used to bury radioactive debris and soil, mainly from numerous ''minor trials'' - British nuclear weapons safety and development experiments - that between 1956 and 1963 caused the heaviest radioactive contamination.

A brief prepared in April for the Minister for Resources and Energy, Martin Ferguson, questioned the capacity of the Maralinga Tjarutja to manage the site.

The files show the government declined requests by the Maralinga Tjarutja to clean up the trials site closest to the village.

The ''Kuli'' site, east of the airstrip, was used to conduct 262 trials, which dispersed 7.4 tonnes of uranium into the environment.

While a partial clean-up in 1998 removed some larger uranium fragments, reports released under freedom of information show surveys in late 2001 and early 2002 found the spread of fragments was much greater than assessed.

The contamination was not assessed as a radiological hazard but the uranium toxicity prompted consultations on a clean-up of the site, and the Maralinga Tjarutja expressed concern about a risk to children playing on the ground.

Federal officials were more concerned that adults could wrongly interpret the yellow uranium fragments as meaning the site was radioactively contaminated, ''which could create an image issue''.

Alan Parkinson, a retired nuclear engineer and whistleblower who questioned the management of the clean-up, yesterday said the remediation had only been partial and ''the remarkable thing really, is how little [radioactive material] we buried''.”

It should be noted that the tests resulted in contamination not just due to uranium but also plutonium and beryllium

Maralinga - Background Information

British nuclear tests at Maralinga occurred between 1955 and 1963 at the Maralinga site, part of the Woomera Prohibited Area, in South Australia. A total of seven major nuclear tests were performed, with approximate yields ranging from 1 to 27 kilotons of TNT equivalent. The site was also used for hundreds of minor trials, many of which were intended to investigate the effects of fire or non-nuclear explosions on atomic weapons.

The site was contaminated with radioactive materials and an initial cleanup was attempted in 1967. The McClelland Royal Commission, an examination of the effects of the tests, delivered its report in 1985, and found that significant radiation hazards still existed at many of the Maralinga test areas. It recommended another cleanup, which was completed in 2000 at a cost of $108 million. Debate continued over the safety of the site and the long-term health effects on the traditional Aboriginal owners of the land and former personnel. In 1994, the Australian Government paid compensation amounting to $13.5 million to the local Maralinga Tjarutja people.

Continues .......

Dalgety Bay and COMARE

It is interesting to note that Dalgety Bay is included in the current work
programme of the Committee on Medical Effects of Radiation in the Environment;
but in response to a FOI request COMARE said :-

"I can confirm that COMARE has not provided any advice to SEPA or MOD on
Dalgety Bay."

This begs a question as to what is the work is COMARE doing in relation to
Dalgety Bay and for whom?

Parliamentary Question - Radium Contaminated Land on the Defence Estate

A Parliamentary Question to MOD Ministers provides a good example of how MPs are fobbed off with a standard line such as “the information is not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost”.


Delving into the past it becomes clear that this might not in fact be the case and that in 2000 the Radioactive Waste Management Committee (RWMAC) mentioned in their report Advice to Ministers on “The Ministry of Defence's Arrangements for Dealing with Radioactively Contaminated Land” that the “Ministry indicated that it was in the process of developing such a database.”  


It would seem that such a database  provides a central repository of information requested by the MP.


From Hansard 


“26 Oct 2011 : Column 261W
Radioactive Waste
Mr Weir: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence at which locations his Department has records of the burial of radium fragments. [75757]


Mr Robathan: The Ministry of Defence (MOD) takes a proactive approach to the assessment of land quality across the estate and to the management of the risks to human health and the environment. This includes radium 226 associated predominantly with the historical maintenance and disposal of luminised instruments especially during and after the second world war and which are present to some degree at many current and former MOD sites.


Where radium-226 contamination has been identified the potential risks are managed at site level. Such contamination on MOD sites is present in a relatively non-mobile form, with there being little to no leaching to soils and limited solubility in groundwater. As such, it is believed that radium and for that matter radiological contamination on MOD sites poses a relatively low risk to human health and the wider environment.


While the MOD has information on those sites which have been subject to land quality assessment, the information is not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.”


Extract from the recommendations  in RWMAC's Advice to Ministers on The Ministry of Defence's Arrangements for Dealing with Radioactively Contaminated Land


"MoD should ensure, possibly in conjunction with other Government departments, that existing records of characterisation and remediation of its past and present landholdings are not lost"


"MoD should be as clear as is reasonably possible about its contaminated land holdings, and should set up a database for this purpose (drawing on LQA findings and on previous site investigation records, including desk studies and other land quality data). At the time of finalising this report (June 2000), the Ministry indicated that it was in the process of developing such a database;"


More detailed information from the RWMAC report relating to record keeping

Dalgety Bay - an example of the internet empowering citizens

The recent revelations in the media concerning the radioactive contamination of the beach at Dalgety Bay may just provide the impetus to get something done to finally clear of the beach of contamination and to call the polluter to account.
MIlcon Research and Consulting played a key role in supporting the media through analysis of publically available information particularly documents published by SEPA on their website.
The example of Dalgety Bay demonstrates that public bodies can be now held to account by the empowerment of citizens through the use of the internet.  Websites such as the “What do they Know” facilitate the use of both the FOI and EIR regulations by the citizen and ensure that information provided is publicly available.

Nuclear Liabilities Management Strategy

MOD despite a statement in its own policy that NGOs must be involved in the development of the “Nuclear Liabilities Management Strategy”; MOD has confirmed through a response to an FOI request that no NGOs were involved or consulted.

This again demonstrates MOD lack of commitment to its own policies; and the continuing use of the discredited “announce and defend” approach to stakeholder engagement.
In view of the lack of stakeholder involvement in the “Nuclear Liabilities Management Strategy”, it will be interesting to see how many opportunities this will open for judicial challenge relating decisions taken to implement the strategy with all the cost and delays associated with such challenges.  In particular the requirement for strategic environmental assessments of policies plans etc and the associated duty to involve stakeholders.

It is interesting to contrast this to enlightened way in which the NDA went about developing their strategy, involving stakeholders through its development.

FOI request
“Request for Information under the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act 2000
Thank you for your email of 16 September 2011, via www.whatdotheyknow.com, in which you ask:

Can you please tell me if NGOs were consulted in the development of the recently
published MOD Nuclear Liabilities Management Strategy” and if so which NGOs were involved in the consultation. If NGOs were not involved in the consultation on the MOD “ Nuclear Liabilities Management Strategy” why were they not involved despite the commitment in the MOD “MINISTRY OF DEFENCE POLICY FOR DECOMMISSIONING AND THE DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND RESIDUAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL ARISING FROM THE NUCLEAR PROGRAMME” That they should be involved .

This is considered to be a request for information under the FOI Act. Section 1 of the Freedom of Information Act gives an applicant the right to access recorded information held by public authorities at the time the request is made and doesnot require public authorities to answer questions, provide explanations or give opinions, unless this is recorded information held. I can confirm that the Ministry of Defence holds no recorded information that would provide an answer to the questions you have asked in your request.”

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE POLICY FOR DECOMMISSIONING AND THE DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND RESIDUAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL ARISING FROM THE NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

MOD Nuclear Liabilities Management Strategy

Radium contamination of Dalgety Bay in Scotland

Since the discovery of radium contamination on the beach at Dalgety Bay in Scotland in the early 1990s there appears little evidence that the problem has been properly addressed and the source of the contamination removed preventing the re-population of the beach with highly radioactive fragments of radium.  SEPA in their recently published report concluded that :- 


“Work undertaken by Defence Estates has confirmed the typical number, size and
activities of point sources at Dalgety Bay. It has also shown that the beach area
continues to re-populate with high activity point sources once cleared and that it is
estimated that over a year these will number about 100 in total. Thus there remains a
hazard to the public at Dalgety Bay from these point sources, and the total number of
radioactive sources at Dalgety Bay remains unknown.


Based on the results of solubility testing, indicative committed effective doses could
range up to 128 mSv for a 3 month old infant, with the majority of the dose being from radium daughters. However, the 2010 work has indicated that the solubility of these sources may be greater than previously expected (25% rather than up to 15%). Doses could also be greater if the relatively small number of samples subjected for leaching was not representative of the population as a whole. Overall our 2006, 2009 and this 2011 report have shown that several of the sources recovered from Dalgety Bay could give committed effective doses in excess of the relevant value for some age groups, prescribed in the Statutory Guidance issued to SEPA by the Scottish Government for Radioactive Contaminated Land.


Direct measurements of point sources to determine potential skin doses have been
undertaken. The results have been reported separately which indicate that it is unlikely the dose rate from the Dalgety Bay sources could exceed the relevant criteria specified in the guidance issued to SEPA by the Scottish Government for Radioactive Contaminated Land.


The potential committed effective doses from Dalgety Bay point sources remain
significant. The primary pathway of concern is via ingestion and as any potential effects (e.g. cancer) may take many years to be expressed and be unlikely to be easily attributable to an exposure from a visit to Dalgety Bay.


The locations and suitability of the current signage, as an optimal intervention measure, should be reviewed. Given the numbers of people using the beach there is also a need for an ongoing monitoring and recovery programme to reduce the hazard present on the beach. In the longer term, as radium has a half life of 1600 years, a programme of work to determine the primary source of the contamination at Dalgety Bay beach and isolate it from the environment may be the only manner in which the level of contamination can be reduced to a negligible level where no further interventions are needed. Given the potential costs involved of developing any robust risk assessment this approach to isolate the contamination from the environment may be the most cost effective approach to mitigating the contamination in the long term. 


The absence of any programme to isolate the radioactive contamination at source will mean that sources which pose a significant hazard to health will continue to be present on the beach at Dalgety Bay. It is concluded that a programme to identify the primary source or sources is needed to reduce the number and hazard of these sources to the public using the beach at Dalgety Bay. “


A point to note is that a recent Press report indicates that material from the beach has been used in children’s sandpits; I do not believe that the risk assessments took account of this possibility.


The Committee on the Medical Effects of Radiation (COMARE) has been tasked to provide advice on the health effects of radium exposure at Dalgety Bay, but has yet to publish its findings.


“Dalgety Bay
The appearance of radium particles at Dalgety Bay first came on the committee’s work programme back in 1990. The discovery of much smaller particles recently has seen this item reappear for further consideration. A site visit by members of the Dounreay Working Group was carried out on 13th May 2008. The committee is continuing to liaise with the MoD and SEPA on this matter. The committee will also be kept aware of other similar contaminated sites as and when issues arise.”


Background information about the historic use of radium by the Ministry of Defence and the problems this created with regard to contaminated land can be found in a report by RWMAC dating back to 2000.


Most recent Press articles as of October 2011

• Daily Express
• Rob Edwards Sunday Herald
• Daily Record
• Dunfermline Press

I find it most surprising that after 20 years the beach still  remains contaminated and a significant risk to those who use it; that SEPA, has so far failed to make the “polluter pay”  to clean this contamination up and make the beach safe for unrestricted use. The present publicity relates to the beach little has been said about the potential contamination inshore from the beach.

In response to the press reports the MoD insisted that it took safety very seriously. “We have yet to see the latest findings from SEPA,” said a ministry spokeswoman. “Should significant risks present themselves then SEPA  has the necessary statutory powers to address these.”

This shows how the MOD is doing its best to wash its' hands of this issue and leaving it to others to clean up, so much for MOD saying it takes safety seriously

Site update

Links to the Milcon Research and Consulting pages on Facebook and to the FOI requests on the "What do they know" website have been added to this Blog.

These can be found on right side of this page under the list of external links.

Staff cuts on submarines impact on nuclear safety

Telegraph reports

Submariners sacked at sea despite MoD promise

“A fifth of submarine medics serving on board Trident nuclear deterrent and hunter killer submarines have been axed, including one who cared for the wounded on the HMS Astute after a crewman went on the rampage. It is understood that several sailors were told they were losing their jobs while conducting covert operations after their captains received a signal at sea from the Ministry of Defence”

“Medical Assistants (Submariners), known as MASMs, play a key role as they have to give both primary and secondary care to personnel on board when the boats are many miles from land. They also provide the main radiation checks and radiological safety on the Navy’s 11 nuclear powered submarines.”

“Their role is so important that if there are less than two on a Vanguard nuclear deterrent boat it cannot sail.”

“We were told that the Submarine Service was protected from cuts but now medics have fallen into the bracket which is absurd,” one submariner told The Daily Telegraph. “Submarine medics are sought after but we a losing almost a quarter of our quota of available medics.”.

“It is understood that between 15 and 25 out of 100 deployable medics have been sacked. The medics receive two years intensive training, including NHS placements, and train intensively on dealing with radiological illness and exposure. On special missions a doctor will join them on board.”

If true this indicates how safety is again being trumped by the urgent need to find cost savings. I also suspect that no assessment of the impact of these cuts on safety has been carried out, as required by para 45 of Chapter 3 of JSP 815 “Management of Organisational Change”. The MOD failed duty to respond to a FOI request on this issue dating back to July, despite a legal duty to do so within 20 working days.

Below is an extract from a course prospectus that gives a good indication of Medical Assistants (Submariners) and the their radiation protection duties.

• I.A.W City and Guilds Radiation Safety Practice Scheme Handbook 7410
• Biological Aspects of Ionising Radiation
• Radiation Protection
• Radiation Detection and Measurement
• Structure of Matter and Radioactivity
• Dosimetry
• Storage and Transport of radioactive material
• Accidents and Incidents.
• Industrial uses of radioactive material
• Regulation and Guidance
• Environmental Control

This Guardian report on the 2010 DNESB annual report gives an indication of how the MOD is using the cuts in the number posts as a means of reducing the number of vacant SQEP posts which gives the appearance of an improvement in the situation.

SQEP staffing has been raised as a significant risk for a number of years in both the DESB and DNESB annual reports. See para 16 of the 2010 DNESB report.

So the statement “A Royal Navy spokesman said: "There will be no shortage of medical personnel on our submarines. Redundancies are only being made in surplus areas."  This seems very strange when set against the 2010 DESB and DNESB reports leaving open the question as to what is the true position!!  

The cuts also demonstrate how little notice Ministers take of reports from the MODs main nuclear and safety committees and the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator.

Defence Nuclear Environment and Safety Board report 2010

The 2010 Defence Nuclear Environment and Safety Board report has been published.



The DNESB 2010 assurance report again shows that the ever continuing reduction in resources is putting the safety of MOD staff and the public at increasing and indeed unacceptable risk.
  
The DNESB assurance reports clearly show the inability of the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator to influence decisions by Ministers and the Defence Board to ensure the provision of adequate resources for the delivery of nuclear safety within the MOD. This also demonstrates the need for a Nuclear Regulator independent of the MOD with proper powers of regulation and enforcement.


The 2010 DNESB and earlier reports clearly demonstrate how the MOD has failed to allocated sufficient resources to nuclear safety in particular the lack of progress on recruiting suitably experienced and qualified staff, the commitment to produce a decommissioning strategy supported with the necessary funding.

Office of Nuclear Regulation and the Health & Safety Executive (ONR/HSE) effective regulators of Government ?

In a recent FOI the HSE was asked; could you please tell me what action ONR/HSE is taking under Health and safety legislation to ensure that standards of safety are maintained in light of MODs’ own admission that safety performance has been and continues to be compromised as a consequence of ever reducing resources.”  The full text of the request is given at Annex A.

The ONR/HSE have so far failed to provide an answer to this FOI request. 

The fact that the Strategic Defence and Security Review ( SDSR ) is a politically driven process within Government and that the ONR/HSE is part of the Government albeit at arms length might explain the HSEs’ reluctance to take action against the MOD whereas the HSE is far more proactive when it comes to the safety failures of commercial operators. 

It is also notable that MODs own requirements for the prior assessment of the impacts of organisational changes set down in JSP 815 “Management of Organisational Change” by MODs ( Annex B) own admission have been largely ignored.

It is clear that the political agenda driving the SDSR and the need to save money are trumping the health and safety of MOD employees and the public.

It is also clear that the ONR/HSE is failing to act as an effective Regulator and in doing so is complicit in putting the safety of MOD employees and the public at unacceptable risk.

Annex A

“MOD have just published annual report on Safety, Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development for 2010

As can been seen in the extract below from the DESB 2010 report it appears that the lessons from the Haddon Cave Review and report have been ignored; in that, decisions were taken in the SDSR/Defence Reform Review without a proper consideration of their impact on safety generally and nuclear safety in particular

Link to Haddon cave Report

"43. SDSR/Defence Reform. The Strategic Defence and Security Review did not, formally, assess the major implications for the safety of the department and there has been insufficient time to properly assess the impact of the SDSR options taken before decisions were made. Therefore the full impact of these decisions might not be known for a number of years. That said, the major issues raised by the Front Line Commands regarding wider PR11 options were discussed at a DESB in January 2011, although timescales prevented a full assessment.

44. It is unclear what impact the Defence Reform Review will have on safety. However the need to reduce costs and the severe reduction in personnel numbers will undoubtedly place a severe strain on safety systems. The department must ensure that mitigation plans are in place to maintain the appropriate standards. SSD&C is in close discussions with the Reform Review team as to how any outcome will impact on some of the wider aspects work and Defence safety as a whole."

The part of the report about Defence Nuclear Environment Safety Board (DNESB) clearly indicates that the ability of MOD's internal Regulator DNSR to do its job is being compromised by the lack resources to quote from the report "further aggravated by constraints on regulatory capacity"

"11. The DNESB Chairman reports that an acceptable standard of nuclear and radiological safety and environmental protection has been maintained in the operation and delivery of the Defence nuclear programmes. Individually, none of the DNESB's 8 issues reflect an immediate safety or environmental concern; but together they represent a potential compromise to compliance or the demonstrability of compliance and, taken together, they present a risk that it will become increasingly difficult to maintain that the Defence nuclear programmes are being managed with due regard for the protection of the workforce, the public and the environment. The principal threats to safety in the Defence nuclear programmes in the medium term are the adequacy of resources, both money and staff complement, and the maintenance of a sustainable cadre of suitably competent staff (RN, MOD civilians and in industry partners). Confidence in making the Substantial Assurance judgement is reduced from 2009 due to the adverse trend in resources (which I expect will become yet more painful), further aggravated by constraints on regulatory capacity.

12. Duty Holders have maintained Continuous at Sea Deterrence (despite increasing pressures on manpower and some equipment fragility) and have safely delivered the required military capability from the Submarine Arm despite reduced platform availability; HMS ASTUTE has become the first new SSN in the fleet since 1991.

13. The main risks/issues are:

a. Lack of adequate resource to deliver the Defence nuclear programmes safely.

b. Measures already in hand may be insufficient to address the present and predicted shortage of Nuclear SQEP in the RN among MOD civilians and Defence contractors.

c. The frequency and significance of incidents remain too high as a result of poor control of work."

Could you please tell me what action ONR/HSE is taking under Health and safety legislation to ensure that standards of safety are maintained in light of MODs’ own admission that safety performance has been and continues to be compromised as a consequence of ever reducing resources.”

Annex B

Defence Environment and Safety Management JSP 815 CHAPTER 3ORGANISATION “MANAGEMENT OF ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE

45. Without adequate planning and analysis, change may result in
 the inadvertent erosion of the emphasis on high standards of
 environment and safety performance. This may manifest itself in the
 loss of established formal and informal environment and safety
 processes, loss of critical safety culture, knowledge and
 expertise, or lack of sufficient personnel to safely operate and
 maintain a process with consequent increased likelihood of
 accidents and incidents.

46. Duty holder organisations shall, prior to any significant
 changes, conduct an environment and safety assessment to baseline
 the existing arrangements for critical environment and safety
 activities; analyse the impact and justify the proposed changes.
 The rigour of the assessment shall be proportionate to the
 significance of the change. Where appropriate and proportionate,
 the organisation should seek the views of the relevant FSBs or
 discipline leads.

47. It shall be the responsibility of the individual or team
 proposing the initiative to implement and complete the assessment
 prior to making any changes. Outcomes of assessments shall be
 included in any submissions seeking endorsement to continue with
 the implementation phase. Once implemented, the impact of the
 changes shall be reviewed after an appropriate period.”

MOD response to the ONR interim report Japan - reactor accident

On the 18 May 2011 the Chief Nuclear Inspector published an interim 'lessonslearnt' report early analysis of Japanese accident which made 26 recommendations for UK.

MOD was asked in FOIs about whether or not it made a submission to Dr Weightman `s interim report and how the MOD was responding to the reports' recommendations. The responses to the FOI requests are given below :-

"our correspondence dated 25 May 2011 has been considered to be a request for information in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act 2000. You requested the following information:

"Please could you tell me

a: if MOD made a submission to Dr M Weightman of the ONR in
relation his interim report 'lessons learnt' report "Early analysis of Japanese accident makes 26 recommendations for UK"


b: If a submission was made, please could you provide me with a
copy of the submission"

I am writing to advise you that following a search of our paper and electronic records, I have established that the information you requested is not held by the Ministry of Defence because we did not provide a submission to Dr Weightman of the ONR."

When specifically asked about how MOD was responding to the recommendation 4 of the ONR interim report

"Request for Information – Release of Information under the Freedom of Information Act "Thank you for your request of 18 May 2011 relating to the publication of the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) interim report, in which you ask: Please could you tell me what specific actions the MOD will be taking to implement recommendation 4 of ONR interim report "Japanese earthquake and tsunami: Implications for the UK Nuclear Industry": "Both the UK nuclear industry and ONR should consider ways of enhancing the drive to ensure more open, transparent and trusted communications, and relationships, with the public and other stakeholders."

This enquiry is being treated as a request for information under the terms of the FOI Act. I can confirm that the Department does not hold any information that falls within the scope of your request.""

The MODs' response to these FOI requests provides yet more examples of the MOD failing to engage and learn lessons with a view to improving safety of the nuclear weapon and propulsion programmes.

MOD annual report on Safety, Environmental Protection

MOD has published its annual report on Safety, Environmental Protection andSustainable Development for 2010

As can been seen in the extract below from the DESB 2010 report it appears that
the lessons from the Haddon Cave Review and report have been ignored; in that,
decisions were taken in the SDSR/Defence Reform Review without a proper
consideration of their impact on safety generally and nuclear safety in
particular

"43. SDSR/Defence Reform. The Strategic Defence and Security Review did not,
formally, assess the major implications for the safety of the department and
there has been insufficient time to properly assess the impact of the SDSR
options taken before decisions were made. Therefore the full impact of these
decisions might not be known for a number of years. That said, the major issues
raised by the Front Line Commands regarding wider PR11 options were discussed at
a DESB in January 2011, although timescales prevented a full assessment.

44. It is unclear what impact the Defence Reform Review will have on safety.
However the need to reduce costs and the severe reduction in personnel numbers
will undoubtedly place a severe strain on safety systems. The department must
ensure that mitigation plans are in place to maintain the appropriate standards.
SSD&C is in close discussions with the Reform Review team as to how any outcome
will impact on some of the wider aspects work and Defence safety as a whole."

The part of the report about Defence Nuclear Environment Safety Board (DNESB)
clearly indicates that the ability of MOD's internal Regulator DNSR to do its
job is being compromised by the lack resources to quote from the report "further
aggravated by constraints on regulatory capacity"

"11. The DNESB Chairman reports that an acceptable standard of nuclear and
radiological safety and environmental protection has been maintained in the
operation and delivery of the Defence nuclear programmes. Individually, none of
the DNESB's 8 issues reflect an immediate safety or environmental concern; but
together they represent a potential compromise to compliance or the
demonstrability of compliance and, taken together, they present a risk that it
will become increasingly difficult to maintain that the Defence nuclear
programmes are being managed with due regard for the protection of the
workforce, the public and the environment. The principal threats to safety in
the Defence nuclear programmes in the medium term are the adequacy of resources,
both money and staff complement, and the maintenance of a sustainable cadre of
suitably competent staff (RN, MOD civilians and in industry partners).
Confidence in making the Substantial Assurance judgement is reduced from 2009
due to the adverse trend in resources (which I expect will become yet more
painful), further aggravated by constraints on regulatory capacity.
12. Duty Holders have maintained Continuous at Sea Deterrence (despite
increasing pressures on manpower and some equipment fragility) and have safely
delivered the required military capability from the Submarine Arm despite
reduced platform availability; HMS ASTUTE has become the first new SSN in the
fleet since 1991. 13. The main risks/issues are:

a. Lack of adequate resource to deliver the Defence nuclear programmes safely.

b. Measures already in hand may be insufficient to address the present and
predicted shortage of Nuclear SQEP in the RN among MOD civilians and Defence
contractors.

c. The frequency and significance of incidents remain too high as a result of
poor control of work."

Associated media reports

Daily Express

Observer

The Scotsman

Sunday Post

Caledonian Mercury

Rob Edwards Blog

Milcon R & C blog report on earlier DESB reports

Proposal for a MOD Independent Safety Organisation (ISO) to include the Defence Nuclear Regulator

Proposal for a MOD Independent Safety Organisation (ISO) to include the Defence
Nuclear Regulator.

As can be seen from the reply to a FOI (below) there in the past there was the
post of MOD Chief Safety Officer; former MOD Chief Safety Officer's headed up
the MODs' central safety organisation independent of the duty holders/TLBS. But
the role was abolished and no longer exists. The proposal to re-establish a
Independent Safety Organisation (ISO), seems as if the ISO is the old MOD
central safety organisation reborn !!

The present central organisation Safety, Sustainable Development and Continuity
(SSDC) Division represents the remaining rump of the former central safety
organisation largely denuded of staff with professional experience and
qualifications in safety as demonstrated by the abolition of the post of MOD
Chief Safety Officer whose post holders had qualifications such as PhDs in
physical chemistry and gas explosions with extensive experience in explosives
and ordnance safety.

Implicit in the proposal for a MOD Independent Safety Organisation (ISO) is that
the Defence Nuclear Regulator will be subsumed within it. It would be far better
for public confidence that the HSE etc should regulate MOD controlled nuclear
activities rather than to perpetuate the current system of internal regulation
with its inherent lack of transparency

From the DESB 2010 report

"39. Haddon-Cave Wider Aspects Work The DESB has agreed that some of the issues
raised in the Haddon-Cave report have implications for the wider MOD. These
issues have been translated into seven workstrands, which SSD&C are
coordinating.

40. Chief among these workstrands is an examination of the current regulatory
regimes in place in the department. The examination to date has identified that
many of the existing internal frameworks do not meet the recommendations of the
Haddon-Cave report (principally that regulators should be independent). These
findings have been agreed by the DESB. Subsequently SSD&C has been tasked with
scoping options for a possible Independent Safety Organisation (ISO). This work
is currently focused on establishing the remit of an ISO with a view, if agreed,
to producing a costed organizational option by May 2011. It is hoped that the
ISO, if created, as the single safety regulator in the MOD (bar aviation), will
have a positive impact on the assurance of Departmental safety standards. It
will also be closely involved in the production of future annual assurance
reports."



Response to an FOI request asking for details of the post of MOD Chief Safety
Officer

DBR-SSDC-Safety Enquiries (MULTIUSER)

Ministry of Defence

1 February 2011

Thank you for your request under the Freedom of Information Act dated 31
December 2010 enquiry asking for details of the post of MOD Chief Safety
Officer, and enquiring after the safety qualifications for the officers who have
held the post.

There is currently no post of MOD Chief Safety Officer. There have been four
members of the senior Civil Service who have had this role (either as Chief
Safety Officer or Chief Environment and Safety Officer) written into their post
description. The titles for the posts were Director of,successively: Directorate
Defence Health and Safety (DDefH&S), Directorate Safety, Environment and Fire
Policy (DSEFPol), and Directorate of Safety and Claims (DS&C). During the last
of these, the role of CESO(MOD) was discontinued. All business areas (eg Army,
Navy, Air Command etc) of MOD do have their own CESO.

As there is no such post, there is no professional safety qualifications
associated with it. Those who held the role as part of their posts had
qualifications such as PhDs in physical chemistry and gas explosions with
extensive experience in explosives and ordnance safety