How Britain risked triggering nuclear Armageddon

Readers may remember media interest in operation "Able Archer"

The Guardian reported "Cabinet memos and briefing papers released under the Freedom of 
Information Act reveal that a major war games exercise, Operation Able Archer, conducted in 
November 1983 by the US and its Nato allies was so realistic it made the Russians believe that a nuclear strike on its territory was a real possibility."

It is therefore interesting to note that 20 years before a similar situation occurred in Britain a the height of the Cuban missile crisis when the world was on the brink of nuclear Armageddon.
Scott D Sagan in his book "The Limits of Safety"  describes how  in the early hours  of the 27th of October 1962 the Commander in Chief (Air Marshall Cross)  decided without reference to civilian political authorities  to raise the alert level of the British nuclear forces to " full operational capability" able to launch within fifteen minutes or less against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.  It is even suggested that the Prime Minister was unaware of the situation. Senior civilian officials  had warned that such mobilizations had sometimes caused war.

The "Able Archer" exercise suggests that the lessons of 1962 had not been learnt and what reason do we have to believe that they have been learnt today.   Sufficient to say that human factors must be at the heart of nuclear safety both civil and military. 

 It is also worthy of note that the operational aspects of the British nuclear weapons programme are only subject to MOD internal regulation rather than independent regulation by the Health and Safety Executive. So both the public and Parliament have to take on trust that operational aspects of the British nuclear weapon programme are being properly managed and safety standards maintained.  

It is worth remembering  that the MOD is and will continue to be subject to deep and damaging 
cuts; how will these impact on the safety ?

Extract from The Limits of Safety - British Alerting Actions

Nuclear weapon safety

Recent articles in the media have raised interesting questions about the safety of nuclear

weapons. Whilst the media has focused on the US military the questions raised are equally applicable to the safety of both current and and past UK nuclear weapons in particular and the MOD nuclear programme in general. The media interest has been sparked by the publication of the book "Command and Control", by  journalist Eric Schlosser. The book  chronicles America's terrifying nuclear mishaps and near misses.

He recounts how in one incident in 1961, days after President John F Kennedy's inauguration, two hydrogen bombs were accidentally dropped on Goldsboro, North Carolina, as a B-52 bomber went into a tailspin. Only the failure of a single low-voltage switch prevented disaster, Schlosser explained to the BBC's Katty Kay. "The bomb assumed it was being deliberately released over an enemy target - and went through all its arming mechanisms save one, and very nearly detonated over North Carolina," said Schlosser.

"And Robert McNamara had just become secretary of defence and he was terrified by this news. We nearly had a hydrogen bomb detonate a few days after JFK's inauguration that would have changed literally the course of history."

    

 
Full length interview below




Above - MIRV War-heads sitting on the delivery bus





The Guardian reported on the book and quoted the author "The US government has consistently tried to withhold information from the American people in order to prevent questions being asked about our nuclear weapons policy," he said. "We were told there was no possibility of these weapons accidentally detonating, yet here's one that very nearly did."

Having previously read the "Limits of Safety" ( ref 1 ) by Scott D Sagan, the revelations made by Eric Schlosse the author of the book "Command and Control" are of little surprise to me as are the lessons for the UK Weapon programme.

This extract from "Limits of Safety" shows the impact on safety of failures of corporate memory when "the complete disappearance of a number of B52 airborne alert accidents from Command's organisational memory" 

Various failings in the MODs corporate memory have been highlighted which suggests the problems of of institutional memory loss are still endemic and lessons of previous incidents have not been learnt. 

Extract from "Limits to Safety" relating to the UK

The incident on the nuclear submarine HMS Astute where an officer was shot dead shows the importance of human factors and suggests that lessons from the past highlighted in the book "Limits of safety" have not been learnt.

Lack of root cause analysis of the problems on HMS Astute; this is a worrying indicator of the defects within the safety and management culture of MODs' nuclear programmes

Further information

List of military nuclear accidents

UK nuclear weapon accidents 

Broken Arrow reports/incidents

Final Switch Golsboro 1961


Reference 1
"Limits of Safety" by Scott D Sagan Princeton Press ISBN 0-691-02101-5

Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator's annual report 2011

The Defence Nuclear safety Regulator (DNSR) have recently published their annual report for 2011 which includes a summary of nuclear and radiological safety and environmental protection performance in the Defence Nuclear Programme (DNP)

Key risks are :-

Red Risk

• Lack of adequate resource to deliver the defence nuclear programmes safely.
• Measures already in hand may be insufficient to address the present and predicted shortage of NSQEP in the Royal Navy, among MOD civilians and in defence contractors

Amber risk

• Safety Cases in the DNP are inconsistent against current good practice; integration of safety analyses for the reactor and weapon needs to be expedited
• The demonstration that the risk from DNP activities is ALARP is inconsistent and tortuous to uncover
• The number of incidents remains too high

"Para 7: At least some of the Issues described further on have their roots in a general lack of resource to address the work required to conduct activities and demonstrate their safety."

This issue has been included as a red risk for years and it appears that no progress has been made to provide the required resources and if anything the situation is getting even worse year by year. DNSR appears powerless to ensure that Ministers and management to provide the resources necessary to safely deliver the MOD nuclear programmes.  

 It appears that only a serious incident would deliver an increase in resources.   This is what happened after  the Pochin enquiry in the late 1970s  following the discovery that 12 of those working at the Aldermarston appeared to have accumulated plutonium in their lungs in excess of the level recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection.  It was this that lead in a large part to the establishment of MOD professional Health Physicists as a separate grade within the MOD.

"Para15: Evidence continues to build that constraints on the DNP’s industrial funding are now affecting staffing levels in Tier 1 contractors; as a result projects run behind declared timetables and important safety submissions are delayed. The trend (of decades) to outsource work from MOD to industry when there are reductions in crown servant numbers (or the inability to recruit), may be approaching a real limit as industry is equally constrained. The limit may also result from the desire to maintain “crown control” of some activities, not least because safety legislation is applied differently (or exempted)  dependant on who is conducting the work."

Highlights the policy  of “crown control” under which the MOD nuclear operations remain largely exempt from civil nuclear regulation.  In the past outsourcing the work has allowed the MOD to meet staff reduction targets but it clear that the limit of this has now been reached if not exceeded.

"A number of incidents have occurred across the programme in 2011; individually they have not been of high significance or safety/environmental detriment, but taken together, they produce concern that working conditions and culture might not prevent an incident of higher significance"

DNSR highlights a worrying trend in incidents but these may well indicate the potential for a more significant incident with wider ranging consequences and may also be indicative of a safety/management culture under stress.

It is worrying that there are problems with integration of safety analyses for the reactor and weapon.  This suggests a "stove-pipe" approach to safety  and that there is insufficient consideration of the combined risks from all the hazards on the submarine, reactor, nuclear weapon, explosive, human factors and external hazards.  The report does not provide any information about what DNSR is doing to address this important issue.

Summary

The report clearly shows that the MOD lacks  adequate resources to deliver the defence nuclear programmes safely.  As far as can be seen DNSR  has been ineffective in persuading management and Ministers to provide the necessary resource.
  
It is also notable that DNSR has not issued any enforcement notices requiring the provision of the necessary resources deliver the defence nuclear programmes safely
. 
It  is also of interesting to see in  DNSRs report,  concerns expressed  about the difficulty in establishing of DNSR’s full complement of human resources in DSEA with the potential to impact on DNSRs' ability to regulate.

The report suggests the probability of a serious incident within MOD nuclear programmes continues to increase.

MOD - Nuclear Liabilities Management Strategy

In 2007 the MOD published its policy on the management of radioactive waste arising from the defence nuclear programmes.

• Policy
• Annex to the policy paper
• Flyer

Four years later In 2011 the MOD published “Nuclear Liabilities Management Strategy “  the strategy was meant to explain how the policy outcomes set out in the policy paper were to be delivered, who was responsible for their delivery,  when these would be delivered,  and to identify costs and how/when the costs would be met.


However the strategy is very much a narrative document describing sources of wastes and options for management.  It is notable that the Strategy is very much focused on the submarine programme.   


There is no mention of decommissioning Aldermaston; the strategy states “End Point AWE will continue to support the DNP for the foreseeable future.”  The MOD is blind to the need to anticipate change and in any case at some point in the future buildings and facilities at AWE will need to be decommissioned and replaced as they age.


The MOD policy required that the strategy would be produced in consultation with stakeholders including NGOs. As far as can be determined no NGOs were consulted. This is in contrast to the national strategy produced by the NDA where the NDA actively engaged with external stakeholders including local communities and NGOs.


The strategy says “The MOD will consider public engagement on a case by case basis taking account of Government policy and environmental and planning law” The policy says 
“the MOD remains confident that in conjunction with stakeholders (OGDs and NGOs), it is able to deliver the policy set out above” 


The expectation was that MOD in developing the strategy will meet the requirement of its stated policy to involve NGOs. However it is now clear from the strategy MOD will only do the minimum required by law 


“6.3 Funding
P134 Expenditure on managing the MOD’s
nuclear liabilities will be appropriately prioritised
within the Defence budget. Funding for strategy
development and implementation is not reliant
on income from the realisation of assets’ values.”


The strategy fails in that it provides no indication of costs or how funding is to be provided against the ongoing programme of resource cuts and savings targets 

In 2007 Hansard reported  decommisioning liabilities of over £ 9 billion

19 Jan 2007 : Column 1365W—continued

"Nuclear Liabilities

Chris Huhne: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether his Department’s nuclear liabilities have been quantified; and how they are funded. [116180]

Des Browne: The Department’s nuclear liabilities are set out in the Department’s Annual Report and Accounts, the most recent version being those for 2005-06 (HC1394) published on 14 July 2006; a copy of which is available in the Library of the House. The estimate of the MOD’s nuclear liabilities (page 220) is £9,753,827,000"

The lack of any costs in the strategy suggest that MOD might be trying to hide an increase in decommmsssioning costs





“6.2 People, Skills and Capability
P133 Available Suitably Qualified and
Experienced Personnel (SQEP) are essential to
the MOD and its industrial partners and supply
chain to deliver successful liability management,
and decommissioning and disposal projects. The
MOD’s SQEP initiatives support the development
and implementation of this Strategy.”


The DNEB have for years pointed out that levels of SQEP staffing are below that required for the safe delivery of the nuclear programme. The ever increasing need to cut costs and the priority being given to delivery of operational capability rather than backend decommissioning  suggest this is a significant area of weakness in the delivery the policy outcomes for managing nuclear liabilities


“6.5 Information and Knowledge
Management


P136 The MOD recognises the long programme
timescales associated with implementation of
this strategy; the MOD’s system of information
and knowledge management is essential for
the effective retention of information and for
maintaining continuity between projects.”


Recent revelations have shown MODs unable to retain information and records over the medium let alone the long term.


Conclusion


The Nuclear Liabilities Management Strategy lacks substance and detail and appears to be little more than an exercise in window dressing, particularly when compared to the strategy produced for the civil sector by the NDA.


Reference:


NDA paper "Non NDA Liability Management Strategy March 2011" includes reference to the Ministry of Defence

Maralinga a lasting legacy of British nuclear weapons tests in Australia

 The Sydney Morning Herald reports

“Ten years after the all-clear, Maralinga is still toxic

More than a decade after the Howard government hailed the clean-up of Maralinga as completed, the government is continuing to support remediation at the former British nuclear weapons test site.

Confidential files released under freedom-of-information laws show Canberra officials have at times been mainly concerned with ''perceptions'' of radioactive contamination while rejecting a request by the Maralinga Tjarutja Aboriginal community for a site near the Maralinga village to be cleared of high levels of contamination. Files released by the Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism show erosion of the massive Taranaki burial trench north of Maralinga, described by officials as ''a large radioactive waste repository'', has required significant remediation. Other burial pits have been subject to subsidence and erosion, exposing asbestos-contaminated debris.

While the documents indicate ''no radiological contamination of groundwater'' has been detected, the government has been obliged, under its 2009 agreement with Maralinga Tjarutja for the handback of the test site, to initiate further work.

The Taranaki trench was used to bury radioactive debris and soil, mainly from numerous ''minor trials'' - British nuclear weapons safety and development experiments - that between 1956 and 1963 caused the heaviest radioactive contamination.

A brief prepared in April for the Minister for Resources and Energy, Martin Ferguson, questioned the capacity of the Maralinga Tjarutja to manage the site.

The files show the government declined requests by the Maralinga Tjarutja to clean up the trials site closest to the village.

The ''Kuli'' site, east of the airstrip, was used to conduct 262 trials, which dispersed 7.4 tonnes of uranium into the environment.

While a partial clean-up in 1998 removed some larger uranium fragments, reports released under freedom of information show surveys in late 2001 and early 2002 found the spread of fragments was much greater than assessed.

The contamination was not assessed as a radiological hazard but the uranium toxicity prompted consultations on a clean-up of the site, and the Maralinga Tjarutja expressed concern about a risk to children playing on the ground.

Federal officials were more concerned that adults could wrongly interpret the yellow uranium fragments as meaning the site was radioactively contaminated, ''which could create an image issue''.

Alan Parkinson, a retired nuclear engineer and whistleblower who questioned the management of the clean-up, yesterday said the remediation had only been partial and ''the remarkable thing really, is how little [radioactive material] we buried''.”

It should be noted that the tests resulted in contamination not just due to uranium but also plutonium and beryllium

Maralinga - Background Information

British nuclear tests at Maralinga occurred between 1955 and 1963 at the Maralinga site, part of the Woomera Prohibited Area, in South Australia. A total of seven major nuclear tests were performed, with approximate yields ranging from 1 to 27 kilotons of TNT equivalent. The site was also used for hundreds of minor trials, many of which were intended to investigate the effects of fire or non-nuclear explosions on atomic weapons.

The site was contaminated with radioactive materials and an initial cleanup was attempted in 1967. The McClelland Royal Commission, an examination of the effects of the tests, delivered its report in 1985, and found that significant radiation hazards still existed at many of the Maralinga test areas. It recommended another cleanup, which was completed in 2000 at a cost of $108 million. Debate continued over the safety of the site and the long-term health effects on the traditional Aboriginal owners of the land and former personnel. In 1994, the Australian Government paid compensation amounting to $13.5 million to the local Maralinga Tjarutja people.

Continues .......