Showing posts with label defence ministry. Show all posts
Showing posts with label defence ministry. Show all posts

Friday, 11 November 2011

Maralinga a lasting legacy of British nuclear weapons tests in Australia



“Ten years after the all-clear, Maralinga is still toxic


More than a decade after the Howard government hailed the clean-up of Maralinga as completed, the government is continuing to support remediation at the former British nuclear weapons test site.

Confidential files released under freedom-of-information laws show Canberra officials have at times been mainly concerned with ''perceptions'' of radioactive contamination while rejecting a request by the Maralinga Tjarutja Aboriginal community for a site near the Maralinga village to be cleared of high levels of contamination. Files released by the Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism show erosion of the massive Taranaki burial trench north of Maralinga, described by officials as ''a large radioactive waste repository'', has required significant remediation. Other burial pits have been subject to subsidence and erosion, exposing asbestos-contaminated debris.

While the documents indicate ''no radiological contamination of groundwater'' has been detected, the government has been obliged, under its 2009 agreement with Maralinga Tjarutja for the handback of the test site, to initiate further work.

The Taranaki trench was used to bury radioactive debris and soil, mainly from numerous ''minor trials'' - British nuclear weapons safety and development experiments - that between 1956 and 1963 caused the heaviest radioactive contamination.

A brief prepared in April for the Minister for Resources and Energy, Martin Ferguson, questioned the capacity of the Maralinga Tjarutja to manage the site.

The files show the government declined requests by the Maralinga Tjarutja to clean up the trials site closest to the village.

The ''Kuli'' site, east of the airstrip, was used to conduct 262 trials, which dispersed 7.4 tonnes of uranium into the environment.

While a partial clean-up in 1998 removed some larger uranium fragments, reports released under freedom of information show surveys in late 2001 and early 2002 found the spread of fragments was much greater than assessed.

The contamination was not assessed as a radiological hazard but the uranium toxicity prompted consultations on a clean-up of the site, and the Maralinga Tjarutja expressed concern about a risk to children playing on the ground.

Federal officials were more concerned that adults could wrongly interpret the yellow uranium fragments as meaning the site was radioactively contaminated, ''which could create an image issue''.

Alan Parkinson, a retired nuclear engineer and whistleblower who questioned the management of the clean-up, yesterday said the remediation had only been partial and ''the remarkable thing really, is how little [radioactive material] we buried''.”

It should be noted that the tests resulted in contamination not just due to uranium but also plutonium and beryllium

Maralinga - Background Information

British nuclear tests at Maralinga occurred between 1955 and 1963 at the Maralinga site, part of the Woomera Prohibited Area, in South Australia. A total of seven major nuclear tests were performed, with approximate yields ranging from 1 to 27 kilotons of TNT equivalent. The site was also used for hundreds of minor trials, many of which were intended to investigate the effects of fire or non-nuclear explosions on atomic weapons.
The site was contaminated with radioactive materials and an initial cleanup was attempted in 1967. The McClelland Royal Commission, an examination of the effects of the tests, delivered its report in 1985, and found that significant radiation hazards still existed at many of the Maralinga test areas. It recommended another cleanup, which was completed in 2000 at a cost of $108 million. Debate continued over the safety of the site and the long-term health effects on the traditional Aboriginal owners of the land and former personnel. In 1994, the Australian Government paid compensation amounting to $13.5 million to the local Maralinga Tjarutja people.

Dalgety Bay and COMARE

It is interesting to note that Dalgety Bay is included in the current work
programme of the Committee on Medical Effects of Radiation in the Environment;
but in response to a FOI request COMARE said :-

"I can confirm that COMARE has not provided any advice to SEPA or MOD on
Dalgety Bay."

This begs a question as to what is the work is COMARE doing in relation to
Dalgety Bay and for whom?

Saturday, 5 February 2011

What no decommissioning Strategy !!!

MODs' own reports acknowledge there is no funding to deliver the decommissioning strategy. However a properly funded decommissioning strategy is one of the key requirements for holding a nuclear site license in the civil sector, why should MOD be any different?

From the 2009 DNESB report

“Decommissioning & Disposal. 2005 issue 3 updated and reduced.
No Decommissioning and Disposal Strategy and no funded plan for decommissioning and disposal of submarine including adequate facilities to de-fuel them at the end of service life”

However the guidance from the HSE to inspectors on decommissioning nuclear licensed sites requires licensees’ to demonstrate that they have funding to carry out decommissioning and for state owned industry should describe their corresponding arrangements.

Extract from “NUCLEAR SAFETY DIRECTORATE GUIDANCE FOR INSPECTORS ON DECOMMISSIONING ON NUCLEAR LICENSED SITES

A2.3.14 Demonstration of Financial Provision

A2.3.14.1 Comprehensive estimates of the costs of decommissioning should be provided and linked to the activities to be carried out. All significant activities should be taken into account including corporate and general infrastructure responsibilities; radioactive waste management, storage and disposal; decontamination and dismantling works; care and maintenance; monitoring and surveillance and any other associated activities. Major cost components should be identified together with the distribution of costs with time. Any assumptions made on discount rates and the timescales over which they have been applied should be justified (see Appendix 6).

A2.3.14.2 Licensees should provide details of the arrangements for the funding of their nuclear liabilities. In the case of the privatised industry the financial provision is expected to be contained in segregated funds, kept separate from other company funds. The state owned industry should describe their corresponding arrangements. Licensees should provide a demonstration of the adequacy of the financial provision being made to implement the strategies. This should show that the strategy does not economically foreclose on earlier options for decommissioning, including an explanation of how the costs will change and the money will be provided if alternative options are chosen.”

Extract from a note by the Health & Safety Executive- Financial Implications of Licence Condition Compliance at NDA Sites:

“Financial Implications for Site Licensees
HSE clearly has an interest in whether the site license company (SLC) has reasonable expectation of access to sufficient resources to enable it to comply with all the Licence Conditions, and to have confidence that those resources will continue to be available at least for the term of the NDA contract. Confidence in the likely access to adequate and secure funding is one factor which HSE takes into account in its continuous assessment of whether an SLC is, and is likely to remain, a fit and proper body to hold the nuclear site licence (bearing in mind that if not happy with the SLC’s fitness, HSE has the power to revoke a licence at any time, and to impose suitable controls on the ex-licensee via Directions issued under the Nuclear Installations Act).”

The MOD is not subject regulation by the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 (NIA65) but subject to a system of internal regulation enforced by the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator (DNSR); it is clear that DNSR lacks the regulatory power to ensure that the MOD decommissioning strategy is funded as would be the case on a civil site regulated by the HSE/NII.

If the MOD controlled nuclear activities were subject to regulation under the NIA65 it is worth considering if HSE would find the MOD fit and proper body to hold a nuclear site licence.

The lack of a funded decommissioning strategy provides powerful evidence of the need to apply the Nuclear Installation Act 1965 to MOD controlled nuclear activities.